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INTRODUCTION

Theory in statutory interpretation has engendered considerable
scholarly debate in recent years.' Much of this debate has centered on2
the renewed allure of a textualist theory in statutory interpretation.
Textualist construction, also referred to recently as the new textualism, 3 demands that, when interpreting a statute, a judge is to limit
her inquiry to the text of the statute. 4 Thus, the judge is forbidden
1. See, e.g., Maxwell 0. Chibundu, Structure and Structuralismin the Interpretation
of Statutes, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1439 (1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New
Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rav. 621 (1990)[hereinafter Eskridge, Textualism]; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Symposium on Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History Values, 66 Cm.-KErTr L. REv. 365 (1990)[hereinafter Eskeridge, Symposium];
Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA.
L. REv. 423 (1988); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The
Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation,77 MnqN. L. REv. 241 (1992); Carlos
E. Gonzalez, ReinterpretingStatutory Interpretation,74 N.C. L. Rlv. 585 (1996);
Earl M. Maltz, Rhetoric and Reality in the Theory of Statutory Interpretation:
Underenforcement, Overenforcement, and the Problem of Legislative Supremacy,
71 B.U. L. REv. 767 (1991).
2. Compare Eskridge, Symposium, supra note 1, at 366 and George Kannar, The
ConstitutionalCatechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L. J. 1297 (1990) with Stephen A. Plass, The Illusion and Allure of Textualism, 40 VuL. L. REv. 93 (1995)
and Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretationof Statutes:
Toward a Fact-FindingModel of Statutory Interpretation,76 VA. L. REv. 1295
(1990).
3. Eskridge, Textualism, supra note 1, at 621.
4. Zeppos, supra note 2, at 1299; Plass, supra note 2, at 94-95; Eskridge, Textualism, supra note 1, at 652.

1996] STATUTORY INTERPRETATION FOR SECURITIES

379

from using the legislative history as a statutory interpretation tool.5
To the textualist, the legislature demonstrates its intent through the
text of the statute.6 Accordingly, a judge's role is to "interpret laws,"
and not to "reconstruct the legislators' intentions." 7 Justice Scalia,
one of textualism's most outspoken advocates, argues that a textbased theory reduces the potential for arbitrariness and abuse that
may arise by having a judge substitute her values for that of the
legislature. 8
In theory, the textualist's argument for judicial restraint is compelling. However, in practice, like other theories of statutory interpretation, textualism is also a malleable theory which can be manipulated
to alter the legislature's intent. Yet, this theory in application can disguise its usurpation of the legislative function. Indeed, a judge applying textualism can actually alter the meaning of a statute, but still
claim that her holding was merely what was called for by the plain
meaning of the statutory text.
Federal securities jurisprudence provides a vivid example of the
ease with which a court can usurp the legislative function. The
Supreme Court's recent decision concerning the enforcement provisions of the federal securities laws provides an example of this sort of
usurpation. 9 In Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver,1O the Court refused to recognize aider and abettor claims
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934's ("Exchange Act") enforcement provision, section 10(b),11 by announcing that in interpreting
5. Eskridge, Textualism, supra note 1, at 652; T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating
Statutory Interpretation,87 MICH. L. REv. 20 (1988).
6. See Zeppos, supra note 2, at 1300.
7. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53
(1987)(Scalia, J., concurring).
8. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law ofRules, 56 U. CM. L. REv. 1175, 1185
(1989)(noting that a text-based approach can avoid the appearance of judicial legislation). But see Plass, supra note 2, at 95 (critiquing Justice Scalia's application
of textualism).
9. But see Public Citizen v. United States Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470
(1989)(Kennedy, J. concurring) ("Where the language of a statute is clear in its
application, the normal rule is that we are bound by it. There is, of course, a
legitimate exception to this rule... [wihere the plain language of the statute
would lead to patently absurd consequences. .. ."); Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,452 (1987)(Scalia, J., concurring) ("If
the language of a statute is clear, that language must be given effect-at least in
the absence of a patent absurdity.").
10. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
11. Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994) provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails,
or of any facility of any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not
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section 10(b) there is no need to look further than the language of the
provision. 12
This Article critiques the development of a textualist theory in securities jurisprudence and analyzes the Central Bank13 decision, an
example of the defects inherent in the application of a textualist approach. In addition, this Article demonstrates how the development of
textualist securities jurisprudence stemmed from decisions that casually rejected precedent and mischaracterized existing law, thereby resulting in a distortion of the legislature's intent. An analysis of the
Exchange Act demonstrates how the CentralBank Court's myopic approach towards statutory interpretation led to its failure to analyze
other relevant Exchange Act provisions, 14 including the most relevant
provision-section 20(a).15
so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
12. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 177
(1994).

13. While several writers have addressed the CentralBank decision, they have generally limited the focus of their analysis to the impact of the decision on section
10(b) jurisprudence. See, e.g., Dennis J. Block. & Jonathan M. Hoff, Securities
Law LitigationFollowing 'Central Bank", N.Y. L.J., Nov. 17, 1994, at 5; Edward
Brodsky, Aiding and Abetting, N.Y. L.J., June 8, 1994, at 3; S. Scott Lutton, The
Ebb and Flow of Section 10(b) Jurisprudence:An Analysis of CentralBank, 17 U.
ARK. LrrrLE RocK L.J. 45 (1994); Thorn Weidlich, Professionals Still at Risk,
NAT'L L.J.; July 18, 1994, at A6. Others have generally questioned or supported
the Court's analysis. See, e.g., T. James Lee, Jr., Note, Central Bank v. First
Interstate Bank: Plain Language and the Implied PrivateRight ofAction Under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 1995 B.Y.U. L. REv. 269,284-86; Glen Wallace Roberts, II, Note, 10(b) or not 10(b): Central Bank of Denver v. FirstInterstate Bank
of Denver, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1239, 1265-66 (1995).
14. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 192-93
(1994)(Stevens, J., dissenting). The decision has also led some to conclude that a
previously important enforcement vehicle-secondary liability-is no longer viable. See David J. Baum, Comment, The Aftermath of Central Bank of Denver:
PrivateAiding and Abetting Liability UnderSection 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 44 Am.
U. L. REv. 1817, 1841-42 (1995)(After CentralBank, "alternative theories of secondary liability are [still] available... [including control person liability]. As the
dissent suggested, however, Central Bank raised some doubt regarding the continued availability of these other forms of secondary liability, particularly conspiracy and respondeat superior liability."). See also Marc I. Steinberg, The
Ramifications of Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions on Federal and State Securities Regulation, 70 NoRE DAME L. REv. 489, 497, 502 (1995)("[Tlhe Court's
rationale precludes imposition of aiding and abetting liability by private plaintiffs for alleged violations of other federal securities law provisions [and] the continued vitality of respondeat superior liability is open to debate, if not
emasculated."). See, e.g., In re College Bound Consol. Litig., FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) $ 98,310 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
15. Section 20(a) is the 73d Congress' secondary liability provision. Section 20(a) of
the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1988), provides:
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In particular, the first section of this Article, after briefly summarizing the CentralBank decision, provides a framework for a statutory
critique by reviewing the popular theories of statutory interpretation.
The second section addresses the forms of secondary liabilityl6 avail-

able under the Exchange Act, all of which were affected by Central
Bank. This section illustrates how the post-Central Bank cases confirmed the dissent's and the commentators' concerns over the viability
of secondary liability under section 10(b).17 The third section questions the CentralBank Court's adoption of textualist theory in light of
its prior holdings concerning section 10(b)'s implied right of action,
which followed a purposivist philosophy.18 The fourth section, in addition to addressing the decision's internal inconsistency, reviews its
sweeping application in order to demonstrate its failure to adequately
analyze the intended role of secondary liability under the Exchange
Act. 19 The fifth and final section addresses the decision's impact and
calls for the revival of section 20(a) in order to follow the 73rd Congress' intent in allowing secondary liability claims. 20 Additionally,

16.

17.
18.

19.
20.

Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable
under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent
as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person
is liable, unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not
directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or
cause of action.
Secondary liability is the principle of holding the defendant liable as a result of
the defendant assisting the primary wrongdoer or pursuant to a relationship that
the defendant has or had with the primary wrongdoer. See, e.g., David S. Ruder,
Multiple Defendants in SecuritiesLaw Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv.
597, 600 (1972).
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 196-201
(1994)(Stevens, J., dissenting)(The majority opinion casts serious doubts on the
viability of all forms of secondary liability under the securities statutes.).
See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12
(1971)(Section 10(b) should be interpreted broadly and is not limited to preserving the integrity of the securities market.); Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972)(arguing that section 10(b) is broad due to
the many times the word "any" is used in the statute and rule).
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 257 (1988)(White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)(The scant legislative history of section 10(b) led courts to look
at Congress' intent in adopting other provisions of the Exchange Act.).
Arthur F. Matthews & W. Hardy Callcott, Creatinga Loophole Against Liability
Within Tightened SecuritiesLaws, N.J. L.J., Aug. 22, 1994, at 30 (observing that
the decision may make more significant the control person provisions of section
15 of the Securities Act and section 20(a) of the Exchange Act). See also Lisa
Klein & John E. Failla, Central Bank of Denver, NA. v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, NA-The Beginning of an End, or Will Less Lead to More?, 49 Bus.
LAw. 1451, 1462 (1994)(noting that the decision may lead plaintiffs to rely on
other forms of secondary liability).
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this section critiques the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995,21 which similarly distorted the 73rd Congress' intent.

THE CENTRAL BANK DECISION AND THE THEORIES OF
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION APPLIED TO THE
FEDERAL SECURITIES STATUTES
A.

The Central Bank Decision

Central Bank of Denver, N.A., ("Central Bank") served as the indenture trustee on two bond issues brought to market in 1986 and
1988 on behalf of the Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills Public Building
Authority ("Authority") to fund improvements of a residential and
commercial development area in Colorado Springs. 22 The bonds were
secured by landowner assessment liens, and the covenants in the indenture required that the real estate subject to the liens have a market value of at least 160 percent of the bonds' outstanding principal
23
and interest.
Prior to the issuance of the 1988 bond, Central Bank became aware
that property values were declining in Colorado Springs and that the
160 percent requirement was probably not being met.2 4 After some
negotiation with the developer, Central Bank agreed to delay an independent review of the appraisal until six months after the closing of
the 1988 bond issue.2 5 However, before the independent review was
undertaken, the Authority defaulted on the 1988 bond.26
First Interstate Bank of Denver, the lead plaintiff, commenced a
section 10(b) securities fraud action against Central Bank and
others. 2 7 The complaint alleged that Central Bank was "secondarily
liable under [section] 10(b) for its conduct in aiding and abetting the
fraud."28 After the district court granted Central Bank summary
judgment,29 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, concluding,
among other things, that the facts established a genuine issue concerning the recklessness element of aiding and abetting.3O
21. Private Securities Litigation Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(1995).
22. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 167
(1994).

23. Id.
24. A Central Bank appraiser, who reviewed the 1988 appraisal, concluded that it
appeared optimistic. Id.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1444. The Tenth Circuit in Central Bank concluded that (1) Central Bank
was aware of the concerns about the 1988 appraisal, (2) Central Bank knew that
the sale of the 1988 bonds were imminent and that purchasers were using the
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Central Bank petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which was subsequently granted, on the issue of whether recklessness satisfied the requirement for aiding and abetting liability when there was no breach
of duty to disclose or to act.3 1 Upon granting certiorari, the Supreme
Court sua sponte directed the parties to address "whether there [was]
an implied private right of action for aiding and abetting violations of
section 10(b),"32 an issue the parties had not questioned and the Court

had refused to resolve decades earlier. 33
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy concluded that the text of
section 10(b) controls the scope of conduct it prohibits.34 The Court,
reaching what it described as "an uncontroversial conclusion," 35 held
that because section 10(b) does not refer to aiding and abetting, those
who aid and abet cannot be held liable.36 Nevertheless,3 7 the Court
still decided to address the 73rd Congress' likely intent,3 s concluding

31.
32.
33.

34.
35.
36.
37.

38.

1988 appraisal to evaluate the collateral for the bonds, and (3) a reasonable trier
of fact could conclude that Central Bank rendered substantial assistance to the
primary fraudfeasor.
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 508 U.S. 959
(1993)(mem.).
Id.
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 191-92 n.7 (1976)("In view of our holding that an intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud is required for civil liability
under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, we need not consider whether civil liability for
aiding and abetting is appropriate under the section and the Rule, nor the elements necessary to establish such cause of action."); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 379 n.5 (1983)(explaining that the issue was reserved in
Hochfelder).
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 173
(1994).
Id. at 177. The Court's conclusion that its holding was "uncontroversial" is the
thrust of this Article and will be addressed and questioned in detail.
Id.
The Court rejected the textual argument that the phrase "directly or indirectly"
in section 10(b) includes aiding and abetting. The Court's problem with this argument was that aiding and abetting liability extends beyond persons who "indirectly" engage in manipulative or deceptive conduct, and aiding and abetting
liability reaches persons who do not engage in the proscribed activities at all. Id.
at 176. The Court had a further problem with the "indirectly" argument, namely,
that there are "numerous provisions of the 1934 Act that use the term in a way
that does not impose aiding and abetting liability." Id. The Court also considered the argument that Congress intended to make aiding and abetting liability
part of the Act because the doctrine was well established at the time. Id. at 177.
After questioning whether in fact the doctrine was well established, the Court
rejected the view that Congress' silence on a potential remedy created such a
remedy. Id.
Perhaps to avoid appearing to have departed too drastically from its previous
decisions, the Court gave lip service to legislative intent despite its holding that
required it not to do so. Id. at 175. However, the Court limited its review to
express causes of action in the Exchange Act and noted that none imposed aiding
and abetting liability. Id. at 178. Justice Kennedy also surprisingly opined that
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that it probably would not have included aider and abettor liability39
in a private right of action under section 10(b).40
In a harshly worded dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
Blackmun, Souter, and Ginsburg, argued, among other things, 4 1 that
the majority gave short shift to the long history of aider and abettor
liability under section 10(b) and imperiled other well-established
forms of secondary liability. 42 The dissent noted, among other
things,43 that in hundreds of cases in every circuit the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") had concluded that aiders and abettors
were subject to section 10(b) liability.44
Finally, the dissent criticized the majority's insistence on addressing an issue not raised by the parties and for writing an opinion that
swept far beyond the issues the majority intended to address.45 The

dissent predicted that:
the majority's approach to aiding and abetting at the very least casts serious
doubt, both for private and SEC actions, on other forms of secondary liability
that, like the aiding and abetting theory, have long been recognized by the

39.
40.

41.

42.
43.

44.

45.

Congress knew how to impose liability on those who aid and abet the proscribed
conduct, but "chose" not to with section 10(b). Id.
Justice Kennedy's conclusion concerning Congress' "choosing" suggests that
Congress expressed its view concerning the scope of liability under section 10(b).
But, as Kennedy admitted, "Congress did not create a private § 10(b) cause of
action." Id. at 173. Congress thus did not "choose" to provide aider and abetter
private rights of action because it did not "choose" to provide for any private right
of action under section 10(b). It is, therefore, illogical to suggest that Congress
intended section 10(b) to not cover certain rights of action when Congress never
suggested that the provision covered any rights of action. Id. at 177.
Id. at 179.
The argument concerning what Congress probably would have done is also misleading. Congress did not expressly include any liability under section 10(b);
therefore, unlike what the opinion suggests, Congress gave no expression regarding the scope of liability under section 10(b).
The dissent also criticized the majority for its judicial activism in the face of congressional acceptance of settled law and questioned whether the majority could
show that aider and abettor liability in any way detracted from the legislative
intent of the Act. Id. at 198. In addition, the dissent focused on the.legislative
purpose of the section and noted that it was passed for remedial purposes and the
Court had previously recognized that it should be read broadly. Id. at 195.
Id. at 200.
The dissent also argued that the aiding and abetting doctrine furthered the Exchange Act's remedial purpose of creating a "securities market that is free from
fraudulent practices." Id. at 193.
Id. at 192. See, e.g., Roberts v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 857 F.2d 646, 652
(9th Cir. 1988)("Aiding and abetting is itself a violation of Section 10(b)"), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1002 (1989); In re Atlantic Fin. Management, Inc., 784 F.2d 29,
34-35 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1072 (1987); Congregation of the Passion v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 800 F.2d 177, 183 (7th Cir. 1986).
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 199
(1994).
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SEC and
the courts but are not expressly spelled out in the securities
statutes.4 6

B. The Theories of Statutory Interpretation Applied to the
Federal Securities Statutes
When faced with the common task of determining what a legislature intended by a particular statutory term, a court engages in statutory interpretation. In other words, statutory interpretation is a
court's quest to ascertain the intended meaning the legislature sought
to give a statutory provision.4 7 In this endeavor, a court's goal is to

determine, according to the prescriptions set forth by the legislature,
the appropriate meaning that ought to be attributed to a statutory
provision.48 A court interpreting a statutory provision seeks to determine the legislature's intent or purpose behind the provision being
reviewed. 4 9 The following is a brief review of the statutory interpretation theories that have been applied in federal securities cases.
1.

Textualism

As previously mentioned, textualism5O emphasizes the commands
of a statute's text 5 l and demands that judges refrain from inquiring
46. Id. at 200 n.12 (Stevens. J., dissenting)(emphasis added). Thus, the majority undertook a virtually exclusive focus on the language of the statute with misleading
references to what it believed would have been the 73rd Congress' view. The
dissent, on the other hand, focused on the universal, longstanding, judicially and
administratively accepted view and congressionally acquiesced position that
aider and abettor claims could arise under section 10(b). Furthermore, the dissent noted the inconsistency between the majority's holding and the remedial
purpose of the statute. While this Article does not endorse either opinion, it will
demonstrate how a more rational opinion could have been reached by following
the 73d Congress' intent of addressing secondary liability under section 20(a) of
the Exchange Act. See infra notes 58-83.
47. Eskridge, Textualisn, supra note 1, at 623; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic
Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. R.v. 1479 (1987).
48. See Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problemsin
the Making and Application of Law, Ch. 7 (1994).
49. See Eskridge, Textualism, supranote 1, at 623; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip
P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretationas PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321,
340 (1990); Steven A. Meetre, Textualist Statutory Interpretation Kills Section
10(b) "Aiding and Abetting" Liability, 63 DEF. CoUNs. J. 58, 60 (1996).
50. There are substantial works on statutory interpretation that exhaustively review
the theories of statutory interpretation, including hybrids of textualism, for example, four-corners textualism versus textual-intentionalism. See, e.g., Gonzalez, supra note 1, at 597-605. This Article focuses on the form of four-corners
textualism or new textualism that has been advocated by Justice Scalia and
others and has caused significant debate over the last decade. See supranotes 12.
51. See Eskridge, Textualism, supra note 1, at 623; Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice
Scalia's Textualism: The "New" Legal Process, 12 CARnozo L. REv. 1597, 1599
(1991).

386

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:377

into a statute's legislative history.52 In fact, textualism mandates
that judges, in interpreting a statute, adhere to the statutory text 5 3
unless the text is unclear or such a reading would result in an absurdity. 54 While rarely addressed by proponents of textualism, a determi-

nation that a provision is unclear or that a literal reading would
create an absurdity is necessarily subjective. Nevertheless, the normative goal of textualism is to eliminate a judge's injection of her values into the interpretation of a statute. 55
Essentially, textualism is based on two interrelated premises.56
The first premise is that the only legitimate source for statutory interpretation is the text of the statute. 57 The second premise is that legislative history, which often comes from hearings or committee reports
and not the Congress as a whole, is not a legitimate source for interpreting statutes.5 8 To the textualist, the "legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used," 59 and it is only
the words used in the statute that is law.60 Consequently, judges are
never to legislate but is to merely ascertain the plain meaning of the
statutory provision at issue. 61
Textualists base their disdain for legislative history on constitutional theory. The argument is as follows: since Article I of the Constitution prescribes the means by which law is to be made and since
Article I grants Congress and the President with the lawmaking powers, legislative history, which does not represent the view of the entire
Congress or of the President, should not be raised to the status of
law.62 To Justice Scalia, elevating a phrase from the legislative his-

52. See Plass, supra note 2, at 94-95; Zeppos, supra note 2, at 1297.
53. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Strict Textualism, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 13 (1995).
54. Eisenberg, supra note 53, at 13; Zeppos, supra note 2, at 1374; Public Citizen v.
United States Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470 (1989)(Kennedy, J., concurring).
55. Zeppos, supra note 2, at 1311.
56. Id. at 1299.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1298. See also Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 68 (1990)(Scalia, J., concurring)("I think it is both demeaning and unproductive for us to ponder whether to
adopt literal or not-so-literal readings of Committee Reports, as though they were
controlling statutory text."); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 601
(1990)(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)joining in
opinion except for that part that examines the statute's legislative history because "the examination does not uncover anything useful (i.e., anything that
tempts us to alter the meaning we deduce from the text anyway), but that is the
usual consequence of these inquiries (and a good thing, too)").
59. United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 604 (1986); Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756-60 (1975)(Powell, J., concurring).
60. West Virginia Univ. Hosp. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98 (1991)("The best evidence of
that purpose is the statutory text adopted by both Houses of Congress and submitted to the President.").
61. Eskridge, Textualism, supra note 1, at 652.
62. See Aleinikoff, supra note 5, at 23; Zeppos, supra note 2, at 1309; West Virginia
Univ. Hosp. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98 (1991).
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tory to the level of statutory text is "about as helpful to the conduct of
[the Court's] affairs as [the talismanic phrase] 'ife is a fountain.'"63
While textualists, such as Justices Scalia and Kennedy,64 reject the
use of legislative history, they, in theory, accept confirming their interpretation by reviewing: (1) the structure of the statute, (2) the interpretations given similar provisions, and (3) the canons of statutory
construction. 6 5
However, textualism does have many critics. 6 6 While they are nu-

merous,6 7 one of the more interesting critiques is that the criticisms
the textualists level against the use of legislative history may also be
equally applicable to textualist theory. 6 8 Specifically, critics note that
while textualists attack other theories of statutory interpretation for
allowing the judge to substitute her intent for that of the legislature's,
textualists fail to acknowledge that textualism is a "malleable theory"
that also provides the judge with discretion to apply the theory with
"as much or as little consistency as a particular judge chooses."69
While as a method of statutory interpretation textualism need not
preordain either a restrictive or an expansionist result, the fact that it
can be employed differently in different contexts raises concerns that
unspoken policy rationales are driving the interpretive process.70 In
fact, by focusing on the text, the textualist accepts and indeed anticipates arriving at results that may be inconsistent with any notion of
what the legislature actually intended. 71 This method of judicial

63. H. J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 252 (1989)(Scalia, J.,
concurring).
64. See supra note 9 and infra note 68.
65. United Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371
(1988)(Scalia, J., concurring)("A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation
is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme."). See also Eskridge,
supra note 1, at 623-24.
66. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, supra note 1, at 423; Plass, supra
note 2, at 97; Stephen F. Ross, ReaganistRealism Comes to Detroit,1989 U. ILL.
L. RFv. 399; Muriel M. Spence, The Sleeping Giant: Textualism as PowerStruggle, 67 S. CAL. L. Rv. 585 (1994); Zeppos, supra note 2, at 1309.
67. Other criticisms of textualism include that it leads to result-oriented judging,
Zeppos, supranote 2, at 1322, and that it shifts power to the executive and judicial branches. Arthur Stock, Note, Justice Scalia's Use of Sources in Statutory
and ConstitutionalInterpretation:How Congress Always Loses, 1990 DUKE L.J.
160.
68. See Zeppos, supra note 2, at 1311; Plass supra note 2, at 101.
69. See, e.g., Plass, supra note 2, at 101; Zeppos, supra note 2, at 1311.
70. Edward A. Fallone, Section 10(b) and the Vagaries of Federal Common Law: The
Merits of Codifying the Private Cause of Action Under a Structuralist Approach,
(1996)(unpublished manuscript, on file with UN-L Law Library).
71. See Zeppos, supra note 2, at 1314 (Textualism accepts and, indeed, mandates
such an approach.); Aleinikoff, supranote 5, at 23 (Textualism is willing to accept
plain meaning as a reasonable approximation of the legislative intent even if the
plain meaning does not identify the legislature's actual meaning.).
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supremacy 7 2 is particularly troubling when a court is addressing re73
medial legislation.
Another noteworthy critique of textualism relates to a court's inherent difficulty in identifying the relevant canonical text.7 4 The
question is whether a court should only analyze the provision at issue,
the entire statute, any related or unrelated statutes adopted by the
enacting legislature, or all of the law at the time of the provision's
enactment. 75 The Central Bank decision demonstrates the difficulty
of this endeavor and typifies an inherent flaw with textualism, which
is the inclination to find that a provision is "clear," thereby allowing a
76
court to end its inquiry.
2.

Intentionalism

Unlike textualism, intentionalism emphasizes the actual or presumed intent of the legislature enacting the statute. It provides that
judges should use interpretative tools to ascertain the enacting legislature's intent regarding a provision's meaning. 7 7 Intentionalism advocates a contextual analysis since a word's meaning is affected by its
context and usage. 78 An intentionalist analysis can be either archeological or purely hypothetical.79
When following archeological intentionalism, a judge searches for
clues in the statute's text and its legislative history that might signal
a legislative intent regarding the disputed statutory issue.8 0 Thus,
intentionalism would support an examination of the events preceding
enactment, such as legislative history, because they may provide insight into how the legislature would have wanted a particular question resolved.81 However, with hypothetical intentionalism,82 a judge
72. See Spence, supra note 66, at 587; Farber & Frickey, supra note 1, at 423.
73. When Congress decides to create law to remedy past wrongs, such as to provide
economic stability in the capital market through the federal securities statutes or

to address this country's history of racism through the federal civil rights statutes, a court, which is largely insulated and removed from this discourse, should
respect the doctrine of separation of powers and should refrain from usurping
Congress' role of legislating.

74. Eisenberg, supra note 53, at 22.
75. Id. at 22-23.
76. The CentralBank decision's narrow inquiry that focused on the provision at issue
distorted the legislature's intent by failing to address other relevant law, such as
relevant statutory provisions.
77. See RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISES AND REFORM 279 (1985).
78. Aleinikoff, supra note 5, at 23.
79. Martin H. Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory and the Legislative
Process: Mourning the Death of Originalismin Statutory Interpretation,68 TuL.
L. REv. 803, 812-13 (1994).
80. Id. at 813.
81. Aleinikoff, supra note 5, at 24.
82. Advocated by Judge Posner, this form of intentionalism questions the use of evidentiary tools, such as committee reports, and argues for a court to engage in
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does not ask what the legislature's stated position was, but rather
what it would have been had the legislature considered the problem
before the court.8 3 Accordingly, under this theory, where no clear legislative intent can be discerned, a judge is to take on the role of the
legislature and determine what it would have done had it faced the
4
issue.8
3. Purposivism
The theory of purposivism focuses on the purpose or objective of
the statute.8 5 Specifically, purposivism provides that "judges should
give weight to the congressional purpose or policy behind the statute's
enactment."8 6 Instead of attempting to reconstruct how the legislature would have likely addressed a particular issue, purposivism calls
on judges to identify the statute's purpose and to resolve the dispute
at issue in light of that purpose.8 7 Under this theory, a judge should
not ask "how did the enacting legislature intend to resolve the dilemma or how would the enacting legislature have resolved it had it
been considered,"8 8 but a judge should "discern the purpose of the
statute by examining the 'mischief the statute is designed to remedy."89 A judge is to read the text of the statute carefully, then infer
plausible purposes of the language, which are to be rational since the
judge has to assume that the legislature consisted of "reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably."90 Purposivism has
been criticized for allowing judges too much discretion, which, according to its critics, may lead judges to substitute their values for that of
the legislature.91
While intentionalism and purposivism are similar, there is one significant difference between them. Intentionalism asks how the enact-

83.
84.
85.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

imaginative reconstruction. Mark L. Movsesian, Severability in Statutes and
Contracts,30 GA. L. REv. 41, 83 n.184 (1995); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 800, 817
(1983); Redish & Chung, supra note 79, at 813-14.
Redish & Chung, supra note 79, at 813.
Gonzalez, supra note 1, at 607-08.
This theory of statutory interpretation has been advocated by the influential, but
unpublished, works of Henry Hart and Albert Sacks. Some writers refer to this
theory as a form of intentionalism. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 5, at 23-24;
Redish & Chung, supra note 79, at 815-17. This Article will treat the purposefocused theory separately from intentionalism since it is less archeological. See
Hart & Sacks, supra note 48, Ch. 7; Meetre, supra note 49, at 60.
See Hart & Sacks, supra note 48, Ch. 7; Meetre, supra note 49, at 60.
Redish & Chung, supra note 79, at 815.
Gonzalez, supra note 1, at 611-12.
Id. at 612.
See Eileen A. Scallen, ClassicRhetoric, PracticalReasoning,and the Law of Evidence, 44 A. U. L. REv. 1717 (1995); Hart & Sacks, supra note 48, Ch. 7 (1994).
Meetre, supra note 49, at 60.
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ing legislature would have decided the interpretive question facing the
court.9 2 To the contrary, purposivism does not seek to determine the
legislature's precise intent.9S Instead, it assumes a reasonable purpose behind the statute,9 4 thereby allowing for more judicial discretion than intentionalism. Nevertheless, both theories9S promote a
judge's review beyond the statutory text into the legislative history to
96
discern the legislature's intent.
97
The earliest Supreme Court decisions to interpret section 10(b)
addressed whether the 73rd Congress intended the section to provide
a private right of action. These decisions could be characterized as
following the statutory interpretation theory of purposivisim,9 8 as
they focused on the "mischief'99 the Exchange Act intended to remedy.
Indeed, these decisions held that section 10(b) should not be construed
technically or restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate the statute's remedial purpose.lOO However, with the retirement of a key member of
the Court, Justice Douglas,O1 the Supreme Court's philosophy towards statutory interpretation took a dramatic change of course. The
Court went from broadly reading the Exchange Act to following a textualist theory of statutory interpretation.1 0 2 The Court's adoption of
textualism in interpreting Section 10(b) has consequently provided
92. Redish & Chung, supra note 79, at 813.

93. Id. at 817.
94. Id.; Ann C. McGinley & Jeffrey W. Stempel, Condescending Contradictions:
RichardPosner'sPragmatismand PregnancyDiscrimination,46 FLA. L. Rzv. 193
(1994).
95. There is a fourth fairly popular school of statutory interpretation, dynamic theory, which essentially analyzes the legislative process by utilizing economics. See
Meetre, supra note 49, at 61. Because of a general disbelief with Congress' ability
to enact laws that truly serve the public, dynamic theorists argue that judges
should, in an effort to reach the best result, engage in active policy making, taking into account current policies and societal values. See Meetre, supra note 49,
at 61. See also Eskridge, supra note 47, at 1483 (discussing the dynamic theory of
statutory interpretation).
96. Meetre, supra note 49, at 60-61.
97. Rule 10b-5 was promulgated by the SEC in order to effectuate section 10(b)'s prescriptions. In order to simplify the foregoing discussion hereinafter, rule 10b-5
and section 10(b) will be referred to collectively as section 10(b).
98. Meetre, supra note 49, at 60 (Purposivism provides that judges should look to the
purpose or objective of the statute.).
99. Gonzalez, supra note 1, at 611.
100. See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972)(advocating a broad reading of statements to effectuate their remedial purposes);
Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12
(1971)(refusing to read rule 10(b)-5 restrictively).
101. Justice William 0. Douglas, the Court's leading securities scholar and drafter of
the Affiliated Ute and Bankers Life opinions, retired in 1975.
102. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 23 (1979)(essential determination to be made is whether Congress expressly intended to create a
private remedy); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 668 (1979)(appropriate inquiry into the existence of a cause of action is one of express statutory
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the Court with a vehicle to restrict the scope of the private civil remedies under the statute. After a brief review of the CentralBank decision's impact on the enforcement provisions of the Exchange Act, the
following sections in this Article will critique the development of the
Court's shift in statutory interpretation.
III. FORMS OF SECONDARY LIABILITY AFFECTED BY
CENTRAL BANK
Prior to CentralBank, private causes of actions under section 10(b)
were based upon either primary liability or secondary liability.1OS
Generally, primary liability is placed on those who have been participants in the primary wrongdoing or have violated an independent
duty. 0 4 Secondary liability refers to the civil liability that is imposed
on those who either assist a primary wrongdoer, as in the case of aiding and abetting, or are in some relationship with the primary wrongdoer, as in the case of respondeat superior.1 05
Approximately ten years after the Exchange Act was passed, a federal court in Kardon v. National Gypsum CompanylO6 recognized an
implied private right of action for damages under section 10(b). Interestingly, that case was based upon a secondary liability claim.107 The
court's creation of a section 10(b) private right of action was based
upon the tort law maxim, ubi jus ibi remedium, which means that
where there is a right, there is a remedy.OS Subsequently, federal
courts, including the Supreme Court itself,109 upheld section 10(b)
claims relying upon secondary liability.11o Such claims were based on
intent); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976)(focusing on the
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

language of the statutory provision at issue).
See Ruder, supra note 16, at 600; Elizabeth Sager, Comment, The Recognition of
Aiding and Abetting in the FederalSecurities Laws, 23 Hous. L. REv. 821, 822
n.5 (1986).
Ruder, supra note 16, at 600.
See Daniel R. Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities
Act of 1934, 69 CAL. L. REv. 80, 83 (1981); Ruder, supra note 16, at 600; Sager,
supra note 103, at 821 n.3.
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
Id.
Fischel, supra note 105, at 80 n.3; Kardon v. National Gypsm Co., 69 F. Supp.
512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 156-57
(1972).
See, e.g., Ames v. Uranus, Inc. v. Sieverling, No. 92-2170-JWL, 1993 WL 106896,
at *9 (D. Kan. Mar. 17, 1993)(holding that in order to establish secondary liability
for aiding and abetting three elements have to be shown); Energy Factors, Inc. v.
Nuevo Energy Co., No. 91 Civ. 4273 (RLC), 1992 WL 170683, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July
7, 1992)(theories to hold someone secondarily liable for securities violations include aiding and abetting, respondeat superior, and control person liability); In re
ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., No. CV 87-3574 RSWL, 1990 WL 132715, at *5 (C.D. Cal.
July 23, 1990); Levine v. Diamanthiset, Inc. No. C-87-5663 MHP, 1989 WL
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a variety of theories, including aiding and abetting, conspiracy, and
respondeat superior.' 1 '
A.

Conspiracy Liability

Conspiracy, a doctrine originally derived from criminal and tort
law,11 2 provides for civil liability against those who enter into an
agreement to engage in both a proscribed act and at least one overt act
in furtherance of the agreement." 3 The first federal case that recognized a section 10(b) claim was based on a conspiracy theory.11 4 In
Kardon v. National Gypsum Company,115 the plaintiffs accused the
defendants of a conspiracy to induce the plaintiffs to sell their stock in
two corporations for less than its true value. 1 16 The court, following a
purposivist theory, concluded that in view of the Exchange Act's general purpose to regulate securities transactions, "the mere omission of
an express provision for civil liability is not sufficient to negate what
the general law implies."117

Similarly, the first Supreme Court decision addressing section
10(b) upheld a conspiracy-based claim.11s In Superintendent ofInsurance of New York v. Bankers Life & Casualty Company,119 the plaintiff, a defunct insurance company, alleged that it was defrauded by
one of its officers and others in a scheme that caused it to sell its securities in exchange for assets the company already owned.12 0 The
Bankers Life Court considered the claim to be based on conspiracy121
and had little difficulty in finding a cause of action under section
10(b).122

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

384853, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 1989); In re Caesars Palace Sec. Litig., 360 F.
Supp. 366, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)(Persons involved in an agreement to violate the
Act should not be able to escape liability.).
See supra note 110.
See Fischel, supra note 105, at 80.
Lutton, supra note 13, at 73.
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
Id.
Id. at 513.
Id. at 514. The Kardon Court based its holding on: (1) section 20(b) of the Restatement (First) of Torts, which provided that the violation of a legislative enactment by engaging in a prohibited act gives rise to liability, and (2) the Supreme
Court decision of Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1938), which
held that a disregard of a command of a statute is a wrongful act and a tort. Id.
Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 10.
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B. Aider and Abettor Liability
Under the federal securities laws, aiding and abetting liability
arises when there is "(1) a securities law violation by a primary party,
(2) scienter on the part of the aider and abetter, and (3) 'substantial
assistance' by the aider and abettor in the achievement of the primary
violation."123 The seminal case establishing aider and abettor liability
under section 10(b) is Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance
Company,124 where a plaintiff argued that a corporation was liable as
an aider and abettor for the acts of its broker.125 Mirroring the
Supreme Court's analysis in CentralBank, the defendant corporation
argued that section 10(b) was devoid of any indication that Congress
intended to impose aider and abettor liability.126 The Court, again

following purposivism, held that "[iun the absence of a clear legislative
expression to the contrary,"127 section 10(b) should be applied "so as to
implement its policies and purposes."12 s The Brennan Court also
based its decision on section 876 of the Restatement of Torts, which
provides for liability for those acting in concert.1 29

C. Respondeat Superior Liability
The doctrine of respondeat superior holds a principal liable for the
acts of an agent if those acts were done within the scope of the agent's
authority.so Thus, the principal may be liable irrespective of her culpable conduct. 3 1 The only relevant inquiry under the doctrine is
whether an individual's fraudulent act was committed within an unauthorized agency relationship.1 3 2 Typically, those who have written
123. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Turtur, 892 F.2d 199, 206-07 (2d Cir. 1989)(In

order to establish an aiding and abetting claim, the three elements must be met.).
See also Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1978)
(explaining in detail the three requirements to establish an aiding and abetting
violation); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147, 154 (7th
124.
125.
126.
127.

128.
129.

Cir. 1969)(The events that occurred were enough to establish an aiding and abetting violation.).
259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966).
Id.
Id. at 676.
Id. at 680-81. As will be discussed further below, a review of the 73d Congress'
intent will demonstrate that Congress intended that secondary forms of liability
be addressed by the "controlling person" provisions of section 15 of the Securities
Act and section 20(a) of the Exchange Act.
Id. at 681.
Id. at 680 (citing Restatement of Torts § 876 (1939)).

130. See BLAci's LAW DicTIONARY 1311-12 (6th ed. 1990); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 219 (1958).

131. Ruder, supra note 16, at 601-03; Fischel, supra note 105, at 86-87.
132. William J. Fitzpatrick and Ronald T. Carman, Respondeat Superiorand the Federal Securities Laws: A Round Peg in a Square Hole, 12 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 11
(1983); Ruder, supra note 16, at 605.
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about the applicability of respondeat superior to the law of securities
have also analyzed the control person provisions of both the Securities
Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") and the Exchange Act (collectively the
"Acts").133

Section 15 of the Securities Act134 and Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act135 each impose liability on controlling persons. The "control person" language of these sections has been treated by courts as
the federal securities laws' modified codification of respondeat superior theories.136 There are, however, significant differences between
the Acts' control person liability provisions and the common law's respondeat superior liability doctrine. Unlike the doctrine of respondeat
superior, sections 15 and 20(a) provide "good faith defenses" to control
person liability.137 Thus, under respondeat superior, a court will only
look to whether the employee's act was committed within the scope of
the employee's employment;1SS whereas, under the Acts' control person provisions, an individual who controls a primary wrongdoer is liable unless the control person acted in good faith and did not directly or
indirectly cause the violation.139
133. See Fischel, supra note 105, at 86; Lutton, supra note 13, 74-75; James L. Burns,

Note, Pruningthe Judicial Oak: Developing a Coherent Application of Common
Law Agency and Controlling Person Liability in Securities Cases, 93 COLUm. L.
REV. 1185 (1993).

134. Section 15 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1996), provides:
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, or who, pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or understanding with one or more persons by or through stock ownership,
agency, or otherwise, controls any person liable under sections [11 or 12]
...shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent
as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person
is liable, unless the controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable
ground to believe in the existence of facts by reason of which the liability
of the controlled person is alleged to exist.
135. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a)(1994).
136. Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 884-86 (3d Cir. 1975)(Principles of
agency, i.e., respondeat superior, should not be imposed under section 10(b) because it would undermine section 20(a).); Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129,
1132 (9th Cir. 1975)(Section 20(a), the controlling person provision, is to be applied when a person violates section 10(b) and not the "stringent doctrine of respondeat superior.").
137. The defense provision of section 15 absolves controlling persons from liability
when they "had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence
of the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to
exist." 15 U.S.C. § 77(1994). Section 20(a) makes controlling persons liable unless they "acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or
acts constituting the violation or cause of action." 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)(1994).
138. Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 132, at 11; Holloway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d
690, 696 (6th Cir. 1976).
139. See 15 U.S.C. § 7St(a)(1994); Ruder, supra note 16, at 601-02; Fitzpatrick & Carmen, supra note 132, at 11.
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In an effort to prevent defendants from raising the good faith defenses available to them under sections 15 and 20(a), plaintiffs chose
to sue under section 10(b) by using the theory of respondeat superior. 140 By using this tactic, plaintiffs' lawyers effectively circumvent
4
section 15's and section 20(a)'s good faith defenses.1 1

D.

Post-Central Bank: The Death of Common Law
Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b)

As the CentralBank dissent feared, most of the post-CentralBank
opinions addressing section 10(b) claims based on secondary liability,
including aider and abettor, conspiracy, and respondeat superior liability, have rejected such claims.' 4 2 In fact, to the probable dismay of
the dissent, at least one court in a post-Central Bank decision
has
cited Justice Steven's language as a basis for its decision. 14 3
The post-CentralBank decisions applied the new law to aider and
abettor claims and eventually expanded Central Bank to other forms
of secondary liability. For instance, in In re College Bound Consolidated Litigation,14 4 one of the first post-Central Bank decisions, the
plaintiffs claimed that the defendant was part of"a full-blown conspiracy.'145 The court treated the claim as an aiding and abetting
claim146 and reasoned that, in light of CentralBank, in order to state
140. Fischel, supra note 105, at 86 ("To preclude employers from relying upon this
good faith defense, plaintiffs have sued these defendants under section 10(b) using respondeat superior."); Ruder, supra note 16, at 602 ("The use of section 15
and 20 has been limited, however, because of the special defenses contained in
the sections."); Gordon v. Burr, 366 F. Supp. 156, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)(The principal virtue of using respondeat superior, for a plaintiff, is that section 20(a)'s good
faith defenses are unavailable to a defendant.).
141. The tactic by plaintiffs' lawyers of avoiding section 20(a) appears to be no longer
available in light of Central Bank. Now plaintiffs' lawyers have to contend with
the good faith defenses of section 20(a)-the section which all along should have
exclusively covered secondary liability claims.
142. See, e.g., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Holmes, [1995-1996 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 99,039 at 94,165 (9th Cir. Jan. 23, 1996) (securities claims raised were similar to conspiracy or aiding and abetting and, therefore, under Central Bank were unavailable).
143. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. United States Envtl., Inc., 897 F. Supp. 117, 119 (S.D.N.Y.
1995)("However, as the CentralBank dissent pointed out, the Court's reasoning
was more expansive, supporting an extension of the holding to actions brought by
the Commission, as well as private parties, ... and to other forms of secondary
liability, such as civil conspiracy as well as aiding and abetting.").
144. In re College Bound Consolidated Litigation, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 98,310 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1994).
145. Id. at 90,134.
146. Although the College Bound decision refers to the complaint, which purportedly
refers to the defendants' acts as a conspiracy, the court treated the claims as if
they were aider and abettor claims. Id.
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a claim a plaintiff has to allege
that the defendant violated section
10(b) as a primary violator.14 7
With but two exceptions,14 8 subsequent cases expanded Central
Bank's mandate, dismissing conspiracy claims.149 Indeed, these
courts held that CentralBank's rationale applied to aider and abettor
claims as well as claims sounding in conspiracy.15 0 In addition, at
least one decision has applied CentralBank to dismiss a claim based
on respondeat superior.15' Thus, courts have concluded that control
person liability under section 20(a) is the only form of secondary liability that remains available under the Exchange Act. 152
While some decisions have avoided expanding CentralBank's hold3
ing,15 one post-Central Bank decision refused to dismiss a section
147. Id.

148. In re Towers Financial Corp. Noteholders Litig, 936 F. Supp. 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1996);
Dinsmore v. Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent, Sheinfeld & Sorkin, 945 F. Supp. 84
(S.D.N.Y. 1996)(These decisions, written by the same judge, noted that the decisions that have expanded Central Bank to conspiracy claims did so under the
mistaken belief that those two types of claims were similar. The Towers and
Dinsmore decisions, however, fail to address Central Bank's narrow reading of
Section 10(b), which should be dispositive.
149. See In re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 855 F. Supp. 1086, 1098 (N.D. Cal. 1994)(no
private right of action under section 10(b) for aiding and abetting); In re Rasterops Corp. Sec. Litig., [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
98,467 at 91,940 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 1994)(stating that "the rationale in Central
Bank ... has extended to foreclose conspiracy liability under section 10(b)"); In re
Ross System Sec. Litig., [1994-1995 Transfer Book] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 9
98,363 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 1994)(illogical to maintain that although Central Bank
prohibits aiding and abetting liability, it permits plaintiffs to bring conspiracy
claims); Van De Velde v. Coopers & Lybrand, 899 F. Supp. 731 (D. Mass. 1995);
Adam v. Silicon Valley Bancshares, 884 F. Supp. 1398 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
150. See in re Glenfed Inc. Sec. Litig., 60 F.3d 391 (9th Cir. 1995); Phillips v. Kidder,
Peabody & Co., 933 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Kidder, Peabody & Co. v.
Unigestion Int'l Ltd., 903 F. Supp. 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); SEC v. U.S. Envtl., Inc.,
897 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); In re College Bound Consol. Litig., 1995 WL
450486 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); In re Faleck & Margolies, Ltd., 1995 WL 33631 (S.D.N.Y.
1995); In re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 855 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D. Cal. 1994); In re
Ross System Sec. Litig., [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
98,363 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 1994).
151. ESI Montgomery County Inc. v. Montgomery Intl Corp., No. 94 Civ. 0119 (RLC),
1996 WL 22979, at *8 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 1996) (rejecting the plaintiffs respondeat superior claim due to the rationale of Central Bank).
152. See McGann v. Ernst & Young, [1995-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep
(CCH) T 99,061 at 94,324 (C.D. Cal. May 30, 1995)(control person liability is the
only form of secondary liability); In Re Cascade Intl. Sec. Litig., 894 F. Supp. 437
(S.D. Fla. 1995)(In light of CentralBank, "[tihe court must now determine which
allegations actually allege primary violations of § 10(b), and not consider any allegations which fall solely under the auspices of aiding and abetting-or secondary-liability.").
153. In these decisions, the courts dismissed the aiding and abetting claims but did
not dismiss other secondary liability claims. How long these lower courts will be
able to avoid addressing the issue of expanding Central Bank to other forms of
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10(b) secondary liability claim. InPollack v. Laidlaw Holdings,154the
plaintiffs asserted section 10(b) claims against the defendants based
on apparent authority.155 After noting that CentralBank "called into
question all common law claims that are adjunct to a direct securities
claim," the court distinguished claims based upon apparent authority156 from aiding and abetting and respondeat superior claims.157

154.
155.
156.
157.

secondary liability is subject to question. The Medeva and Omnitrition opinions
did not address the Central Bank decision in their analysis of the conspiracy
claims, but it is unclear whether defendants raised the Central Bank argument.
In re Medeva Sec. Litg., [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T
98,323 at 90, 238 (C.D. Cal. June 8, 1994)(holding that the plaintiffs had adequately stated a claim for secondary liability under control person liability and
conspiracy under section 10(b)); In re Omnitrition Intl., Inc., Sec. Litig., [19941995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,425 at 90,923(N.D. Cal. July
26, 1994)(plaintiffs did not have enough evidence to state their conspiracy
claims). In another post-CentralBank decision, the court refused to dismiss the
conspiracy claims, finding that defendants were charged with primary liability.
Adam v. Silicon Valley Bancshares, 884 F. Supp. 1398, 1402 (N.D. Cal. 1995)(explaining that the Central Bank decision limited its holding to the issue of
whether a private cause of action existed for aiding and abetting).
Pollack v. Laidlaw Holdings, [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T
98,741 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 1995).
Id.
Apparent authority, which establishes an agency relationship, is found when the
agent's tortious action, while not actually authorized by the principal, appears to
be authorized to those adversely affected. Burns, supra note 133, at 1190 n.25.
Pollack v. Laidlaw Holdings, [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T
98,741 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 1995). The court first distinguished claims premised
upon aiding and abetting by noting that liability based upon apparent authority
has long been recognized by federal courts and by pointing out that under the
apparent authority theory it is not necessary that the agent act with the intent to
benefit the principal. Id. at 92,510. The court distinguished respondeat superior
liability by noting that it is based solely on the position of the employee, whereas
under apparent authority, it requires some preexisting relation between the principal and the customer. Id. at 92,510 n.20.
The Pollack decision, however, is flawed. While it refers to Central Bank, it
does not follow its language. The Pollack decision did not recognize that section
10(b) made no reference to vicarious liability or apparent authority. Id. Accordingly, under Central Bank, the claims in Pollack should have been dismissed.
The Pollack court upheld the apparent authority claim because such claims were
widely recognized by federal courts. This same argument was made in Central
Bank in an effort to uphold aider and abettor liability under section 10(b) but was
specifically rejected by the Court. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 178 (1994). The Pollack court should have addressed the issue more directly by using the line of cases prior to Central Bank,
where the Supreme Court endorsed liability under section 10(b) and other statutory claims based on agency and other secondary liability principles. In particular, the Pollack court could have rested its decision on the Affiliated Ute decision,
where the Supreme Court upheld section 10(b) liability based on respondeat superior and stated that "the liability of[a] bank, of course, is coextensive with that
of [its officers]." Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,
154 (1992). See also supra note 109.
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In short, most lower courts have expanded CentralBank's holding.
However, a few have either avoided the issue or refused to apply Central Bank's analysis to other forms of secondary liability. The following section demonstrates how the inconsistent treatment of the
CentralBank decision by lower courts is a result of the CentralBank
Court's failure to reconcile inconsistent precedent and to fully address
the role of secondary liability under the Exchange Act.
IV. THE GENESIS AND EVOLUTION OF THE SUPREME
COURT'S THEORY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION WITH
RESPECT TO SECTION 10(b)'S PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
Shortly after the Stock Market Crash of 1929, the 73rd Congress
enacted the first two components of the federal securities statutory
scheme.158 The Securities Act and the Exchange Act sought to protect
investors and promote market stability by instituting a philosophy of
full disclosure concerning the companies traded in the securities market.159 In order to ensure that their purposes would be achieved, Congress provided that violators of the Acts would be subject to criminal
sanctions and express civil private rights of action. 160 In addition,
federal courts, acknowledging the remedial purpose of the legislation,
implied private rights of action under other provisions of the Acts.161
158. The federal securities statutory scheme consists of the following statutes: The
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm (1994); The Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1994); The Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1994); The Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15
U.S.C. § 77aaa-77bbbb (1994); The Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80a-a and 80A-64; The Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-180b-21 (1994); and The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L.
No. 104-67, 109 Stat 737 (1995)(hereinafter "Reform Act").
159. 78 CONG. REc. 7689 (1934)"The legislation will restore confidence in investors

and will restrict the gambling activities of those who manipulated the markets.");
S. Rep. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1933)("The Exchange Act adds to the
ancient rule of caveat employer, by furthering the doctrine to include let the
seller also beware. It puts the burden of telling the whole truth on the seller.");
H.R. Rep. No. 229, 91 (1975)("The Exchange Act was intended to provide a fair
and honest mechanism for the pricing of securities and to assure that the dealing
in securities is fair."). See also Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States,
406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972)(The purpose of the Exchange Act and its companion
legislative enactments is to embrace a philosophy of full disclosure instead of a
philosophy of caveat emptor.); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.,
404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971); J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)(holding
that among the chief purposes of the Exchange Act is the protection of investors);
Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 155 (1976)(The primary purpose
of the Exchange Act was "to provide a fair and honest mechanism for the pricing
of securities.").
160. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983).
161. Id. at 380. See also Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6,
13 n.9 (1971)(affirming implied private rights of action under section 10(b));
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976)(recognizing the existence
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One such implied private right of action became the key enforcement
tool of the Exchange Act,162 deriving from section 10(b) and its administrative counterpart, rule 10b-5.163

Essentially, a section 10(b) action is a claim based on fraud. Despite the onerous pleading requirements for drafting a claim based on
fraud, the right of action under section 10(b)164 and its administrative
counterpart, rule 10b-5, became the primary enforcement tool for private litigants. 165 In fact, section 10(b) has been considered the "catchall antifraud provision" and the "all-encompassing' antifraud

162.

163.

164.
165.

of a private cause of action for violations of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5); J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (Even though there is no specific
reference to a private cause of action, one of the chief purposes is to protect investors.); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946)(holding that civil liability for violation of a statute accrues to a member of a class,
which in this case is any type of investor in the securities market); Brennan v.
Iidwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680 (N.D. Ind. 1966)(civil
liability was rested on the tort principles of "maxim, ubi jus, ibi remedium" where there is a right, there is a remedy, by the courts in general); See also L.
Loss & J. SELIGMAN, SEcururs REGULATION, 4312-39 (1992)(collecting cases).
Joseph A. Grundfest, DisimplyingPrivateRights ofAction Under the FederalSecurities Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 HARv. L. REV. 961, 965
(1994)(section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 have become civil plaintiffs' primary weapon
in their battle against securities fraud). See also Sager, supra note 103, at 822
n.5 (roughly one-third of all securities law cases are brought under section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5; by 1965 Rule 10b-5 was generating almost as much litigation as
all the other general antifraud provisions combined); Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985)(implied private rights of action provide a most effective weapon in the enforcement of the securities laws).
Section 10(b)'s administrative counterpart, rule 10b-5, promulgated by the SEC,
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails
or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994).
Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985) ("Implied private rights of action provide a most effective weapon in the enforcement
of the securities laws."). See also Grundfest, supra note 162, at 963 (the private
right of action implied under rule 10b-5 has become civil plaintiffs' primary
weapon in their battle against securities fraud); Daniel J. Bacastow, Due Process
and Criminal Penalties Under Rule 10b-5: The Unconstitutionality and Inefficiency of CriminalProsecutionsfor Insider Trading,73 J. CPm. & CRIMINOLOGY
L. 96 (1982)(Rule 10b-5 has for many years served as a foundation for an aggressive enforcement program under the federal securities laws.).
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enforcement tool of the securities laws.166 Therefore, private litigants
frequently used section 10(b) to bring both primary and secondary liability claims.167

A.

The Early Cases

In the Supreme Court's earliest decision interpreting section 10(b),
it, following the theory of purposivism, focused on the "mischief' the
statute was designed to remedy16S and emphasized the remedial purpose behind the Exchange Act.169 Specifically, in the first instance

where the Court addressed section 10(b), the Court led by Justice
Douglas, the leading securities scholar on the Court,170 held that the
Acts should be read liberally. In Superintendentof Insurance of New
York v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,171 the plaintiff, a liquidator of an
insurance company, alleged that the company was wrongfully induced
to sell securities owned by it.172 Justice Douglas, writing for a unanimous Court, upheld the corporation's right of action to redress section
10(b) violations. He concluded that "section 10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively."'173 In addressing the conspiracy
claim, Justice Douglas noted that
[tihe fact that the fraud was perpetrated by an officer of [the corporation] and
his outside collaborators is irrelevant to our problem .... Since there was a
sale of a security and since fraud was used in connection with it, there is redress under
section 10(b), whatever might be available as a remedy under
1 74
state law.

A year later, in 1972, the Court decided Affiliated Ute Citizens of
Utah v. United States.175 Justice Douglas, writing for the Court
again, referred back to his language in Bankers Life and focused on
166. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980)(section 10(b), the "catchall provision"); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 690 (1980) (section 10(b), the "allencompassing" provision).
167. See Fischel, supra note 105, at 20-83; Ruder, supra note 16, at 600; Sager, supra
note 103, at 821.
168. Gonzalez, supra note 1, at 610.
169. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13
(1971); Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 156-59
(1972).
170. Prior to joining the Court, Justice Douglas was the third chairman of the SEC
and had assisted in the creation of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. See
HE SHALL NOT PASS THiS WAY AGAIN: THa LEGACY OF JUSTICE WILLiAM 0. DouGLAS (Stephen L. Wasby ed., 1990); William D. Douglas & George E. Bater, The
Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171 (1933).
171. 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
172. Id. at 7-8.
173. Id. at 12.
174. Id. at 10, 12.
175. 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972).
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the legislation's purpose.' 7 6 The Court held that the Exchange Act
was to be construed "not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to
effectuate its remedial purposes." 177
B. The Cort v. Ash Test for Implying Private Rights of
Action
Shortly after the Court's first proclamations concerning section
10(b), the Court resolved the issue of when a court could imply a right
of action under a statute. To resolve this issue, the Court endorsed its
previous focus on the legislature's purpose. In a unanimous decision,
the Court in Cort v. Ash'TS appeared to follow a purposivist-intentionalist combination and established four factors to determine whether
there is a private remedy implicit in a statute. The factors established
by Cort379 did not focus on the language of the statute, but on its purpose. These factors were: (1) whether the plaintiff was a part of the
intended class targeted by the statute; 8 0 (2) whether there was any
indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create
such a remedy or to deny one;3S1 (3) whether it is consistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy;18 2 and (4) whether the cause of action is one traditionally delegated to state law.183 Even Justice Rehnquist, a follower of
textualism, 8 4 accepted the fact that three out of the four Cort factors
focused on legislative intent. 8 5
176. Interestingly, the first two Supreme Court decisions to recognize an implied
cause of action under section 10(b), Banker's Life and Affiliated Ute, were based
on secondary liability claims, conspiracy and respondeat superior, respectively.
Although conspicuously not addressed by the majority in CentralBank, the Affiliated Ute decision is at odds with CentralBank not only because of its broad reading of the statute, but also because it specifically recognized an implied right of
action based upon secondary liability. Id. The Affiliated Ute Court, relying on
agency principles, found a bank liable as a result of the actions of its employees.
Resting its decision on respondeat superior or other agency-like principles, the
Court concluded, without discussion or analysis, that "the liability of the bank, of
course, is coextensive with that of [its officers]." Id. at 154.
177, Id. at 151.
178. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
179. It should be noted that the Cort v. Ash test is not confined to implying rights
under the securities laws. Id. at 66.
180. Id. at 78.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Public Citizen v. United States Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 467 (1989)(Kennedy, J., concurring)(oined by Chief Justice Rehnquist).
185. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979)("Indeed, the first
three factors discussed in Cort-the language and focus ofthe statute, its legislative history and its purpose... are ones traditionally relied upon in determining
legislative intent.").
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C. The Move Towards Textualism
With the retirement of Justice Douglas, the Court, which was for
the most part comprised of the same justices, rejected its previous
unanimous decisions without expressly analyzing them and initiated
its move towards a textualist interpretation of the securities laws.
The clearest example of the Court's shift comes from the Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redingtonl86 decision. The Touche Ross Court held that the
appropriate inquiry into the existence of a statutory cause of action is
one of express statutory intent, and summarily concluded that determinations of implied causes of action based on tort principles were
misplaced.18 7 The Touche Ross Court, focusing on the language of section 17(a) of the Exchange Act, concluded that it did not provide a
private right of action because there was no express congressional intent to create such a remedy.1Ss The Touche Ross Court gave lip service to the Cort decision by allegedly focusing on Congress' intent, but
also noted that the central inquiry was whether Congress gave express indications in the statute that it intended to create a cause of
action. 189

The Court's analysis in Touche Ross was a drastic departure from
the Court's earlier proclamations concerning statutory interpretation
in the securities field. Indeed, the decision represented a rejection of
the Court's previous philosophy, pronounced in Cort,190 concerning
implied rights of action. 19 1 In support of its new textualist approach,
the Touche Rossl 9 2 Court quoted from its decision in Cannon v. University of Chicago,193 which noted that "the fact that a federal statute
has been violated and some person harmed does not automatically
give rise to a private cause of action in favor of that person."194 Thus,
the Touche Ross Court used the Cannon quote to suggest that the
Court had previously moved closer to adopting a textualist
philosophy.1 95
186. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
187. Id. at 568.

188. Id.
189. Id. at 575-76.
190. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 189 (1988)(Scalia, J., concurring)("We effectively overruled the Cort v. Ash analysis in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington.").
191. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1977). See also Texas Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S.

192.
193.
194.
195.

33, 39 (1916); Piedmont & Northern Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n., 286
U.S. 299, 311 (1932)(remedial legislation should be given a liberal interpretation
and "requires a broader and more liberal interpretation than that to be drawn
from mere dictionary definitions of the words employed by Congress").
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979).
441 U.S. 677 (1979).
Id. at 688.
Interestingly, the Cannon Court never distinguished its decision in Texas Pacific
R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916), which specifically held that a violation of
a statute is tantamount to a tort.
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While the Touche Ross Court cited to Cannon in order to support
its new approach to statutory interpretation, the decision mischaracterized Cannon. Despite the quote in Cannon, the Cannon
Court did not use a textualist approach, but instead relied on the Cort
decision's four factors.19 6 In fact, using an analysis that was completely at odds with Touche Ross' textual approach, the Cannon Court
held that "the threshold question under Cort is whether the statute
was enacted for the benefit of a special class of which the plaintiff is a
member."197
In the same year that the Court decided Touche Ross, the Court
decided TransamericaMortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,198 where it

rejected an implied claim under section 206 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940. Once again, the Court mischaracterized the Cannon
decision and implicitly rejected the Cort factors.199 The Transamerica
Court held that the essential determination to be made is whether
Congress expressly stated its intent in the statute to create the private remedy asserted.200
Prior to its decision in Touche Ross, the Court, in the context of
section 10(b) jurisprudence, gave indications of its intent to change its
approach with regards to statutory interpretation. The earliest example was Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,201 where the Court
focused on section 10(b)'s language and made a fairly unremarkable
conclusion of limiting recovery for manipulative or deceptive acts to
section 10(b)'s "in connection with the purchase or sale of (or any attempt to sell) a security" language. 20 2 A year later, after Justice
Douglas had resigned, the Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder2O3
began its attack on its previous holdings concerning statutory interpretation. The issue before the Hochfelder Court was whether section
10(b) proscribed negligent conduct.2 0 4 The Court, relying heavily on
the language of the section, held that because section 10(b) "clearly
connotes intentional misconduct," negligent conduct does not give rise
to liability under the section. 20 5 The Hochfelder Court pronounced,
for the first time in the securities area, that the statute's language
was the focus and starting point of the Court's analysis.206 Shortly
after Hochfelder, commentators predicted that the decision repre196.
197.
198.
199.

Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979).
Id. at 689.
444 U.S. 11 (1979).
Id. at 15-16.

200. Id.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

421 U.S. 723 (1975).
Id. at 732.
425 U.S. 185 (1976).
Id. at 187-88.
Id. at 201.
Id. at 197.
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sented the Court's shift towards textualism and its new effort to limit
the scope of the coverage and protections the Acts offered to the investing public.207
Interestingly, the cases that the Ernst Court cited do not support
its textualist twist. For instance, Ernst cited to Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,208 where
he noted that when interpreting a statute a court should begin with
the language of the statute. However, Justice Powell's opinion also
acknowledged the usefulness of looking at the statute's legislative history. 20 9 Additionally, the Ernst Court cited to FTC v. Bunte Bros,
Inc., 2 10 where the Court specifically held that when interpreting a
statute a court should not interpret the statute by exclusively looking
211
at its text.
A year after its decision in Ernst, the Court in Santa Fe Industries,
Inc. v. Green,2 12 predictably by then, 2 13 rejected the fraud claims of
the minority shareholders against the parent company's merger efforts because "[tihe language of section 10(b) gives no indication that
Congress meant to prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation or
deception." 2 14 Subsequent decisions similarly followed a textualist
21
approach. 5
In short, soon after the Court held that section 10(b) should be read
broadly and established the Cort v. Ash test to determine when a
cause of action may be implied under a statute, the Court began to
demonstrate its fondness for the textualist approach, thereby "effectively overruling" established law such as Cort and Banker's Life,
without specifically analyzing or overturning it.216 The Court charted
207. See, e.g., Lewis D. Lowenfels, Recent Supreme CourtDecisions Under the Federal
Securities Laws, the Pendulum Swings, 65 GEo. L.J. 891 (1977).
208. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1975).
209. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 722, 756-58 (1975)(Powell, J.,
concurring).
210. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1975).
211. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Bunte Bros, 312 U.S. 349, 351 (1941).
212. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
213. Finding that Congress did not intend "to bring within the scope of section 10(b)
instances of corporate mismanagement," the Court noted that private rights of
action "should not be implied where it is 'unnecessary to ensure the fulfillment of
Congress' purposes' in adopting that Act." Id. at 477.
214. Id. at 473 (emphasis added).
215. See, e.g., Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083 (1991); TransAmerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979). But see Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983); United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S.
768 (1979).
216. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 189 (1988)(O'Connor, J., concurring("We
effectively overruled the Cort v. Ash analysis in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington
and TransamericaMortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, converting one of [Cort's]
four factors (congressional intent) into the determinative factor, with the other
three merely indicative of its presence or absence.")(emphasis added).

1996] STATUTORY INTERPRETATION FOR SECURITIES

405

a new course-sometimes through the use of misquotations and misplaced reasoning such as in Touche Ross217 that resulted in a narrower, inflexible approach to statutory interpretation.218 Eventually,
this new approach, which called for a threshold and primary analysis
of the language of the statute itself,219 led to an exclusive inquiry into

only the text of the statute as evidenced in CentralBank.
The trend in Supreme Court securities caselaw of overturning law
by implication in the name of textualism is troubling and should not
be condoned because it rejects the foundation of jurisprudence-the
value of precedent. As evidenced in its development in the securities
field, textualism, notwithstanding its proclamations to the contrary,
actually facilitates a judge's manipulation of the provision at issue,
along with prior precedent, in order to find a "plain meaning."220
Such an approach can easily lead to perceptions that the decision was
based on unspoken policy motivations. 2 2 1 While textualism may lead
to conclusions that are ultimately correct, particularly when the legislative history is consistent with a plain meaning analysis, the following sections illustrate how the textualist approach may distort the
legislature's intent and may leave more issues unresolved than a decision settles.
D. How Central Bank Illustrates an Inherent Flaw in the
Textualist Approach
Not only is the Court's textualist approach in Central Bank of
troubling precedential underpinnings, but the CentralBank decision
also typifies a fundamental flaw in textualist theory. By undertaking
a virtually exclusive focus on the text of the provision at issue, the
textualist approach effectively facilitates rewriting the statute at
issue.
One of the many criticisms of the textualist approach is the difficulty in identifying the relevant canonical text.222 One writer asks,
"[i]s the relevant text then only the statutory provision or the entire
statute?... Going one step further, it would be equally foolish to treat
as irrelevant the text of any statute adopted by the legislature that
adopted the provision at issue. " 223 While textualism in theory sup-

ports a review of the entire statute at issue, in practice, a judge apply217. See supra notes 185-95 and accompanying text.
218. See also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975)(focusing on
the language of section 10(b) and prohibiting plaintiffs who were neither purchasers nor sellers of securities).
219. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
220. Zeppos, supra note 2, at 1322. See also Plass, supra note 2, at 110-21.
221. Ross, supra note 66 (arguing that textualism can lead to a partisan application of
the law).
222. See Eisenberg, supra note 53, at 22-26; Plass, supra note 2, at 107-08.
223. Eisenberg, supra note 53, at 22-23.
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ing textualism can easily conclude that the text of a provision at issue
is clear, thereby limiting her inquiry to the text of that provision. 22 4
Such an approach allows the judge to usurp the legislative function
and to deviate from the legislature's intent.2 25 Unfortunately, in
many respects, this is exactly what occurred in Central Bank.
The CentralBank Court stated that even if the text of section 10(b)
did not resolve the issue, it would nevertheless have reached the same
conclusion as a result of looking at the express rights of action under
the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.226 The Court, however, proceeded to analyze the issue narrowly by only looking at the provisions
where aider and abettor liability arose under the Acts.227 Using this
myopic approach to resolve an issue of secondary liability gave the
Court ample opportunity to avoid other relevant text in the Exchange
Act. Although the decision failed to address it,22s the truly relevant
issue the Court was analyzing was the role of secondary liability
under the Exchange Act. However, by narrowly focusing its analysis
on aider and abettor liability under section 10(b), the Court was able
to limit its inquiry to aider and abettor liability under the Acts and to
section 10(b) precedent.229 The Court utterly failed to address the
provision in the Exchange Act that was most relevant-section
20(a)-where Congress expressly addressed secondary liability.230
Although the decision only dealt specifically with aiding and abetting, as addressed previously, it has been interpreted to be much
broader in scope. 2 3 1 Several writers, including Justice Stevens, have
noted that as a result of the decision, private litigants will have to
resort to theories of liability based on primary violations.232 To most
observers, the Central Bank Court effectively pruned the judicial
oak233 by removing a massive bough with leaves that constituted all
the traditional forms of secondary liability.234 While section 20(a)'s
224. See, e.g., Plass, supra note 2, at 106.
225. Eisenberg, supra note 53, at 23-24. See also Plass, supra note 2, at 106. As mentioned above, a basic goal of textualism is to avoid judges replacing the legislature's values with their own. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
226. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 178
(1994).

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id. at 180-81.
Id. at 185.
Id. at 178-88.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1994).
Steinberg, supra note 14, at 500. See also supra notes 143-51.
See, e.g., Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S.
164, 192 (1994)(Stevens, J., dissenting). See also supranote 151 and accompanying text.
233. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
234. Scott M. Murray, Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver:
The Supreme Court Chops a Bough from the JudicialOak, 30 NEw ENG. L. REV.
475 (1996).
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control person liability is still available as a basis for secondary liability, as a result of the decision's failure to fully address the role of secondary liability under the Exchange Act and the deemphasizing of
section 20(a) by the plaintiffs' bar, many observers, including a minority of justices on the Court, call into question the role of secondary
liability under the Exchange Act.235 Therefore, as a result of the

flawed use of the textualist approach, the 73rd Congress' intended vehicle for addressing secondary liability236-section 20(a)-currently
remains misunderstood and underutilized.237
V. THE ISSUES LEFT UNRESOLVED BY AND THE IMPACT
OF THE CENTRAL BANK DECISION

The CentralBank decision has been described as a bombshell that
has ushered in a new era of reform,23s but the decision is not even
internally consistent. Using a textualist approach, the Court refused
to recognize under section 10(b) a common form of secondary liability,
aider and abettor liability, because the "text" of the statute did not
explicitly provide for such a claim. Under this approach, however,
there should be no rights of action under section 10(b) because the text
of the section contains no explicit rights of action. Nonetheless, the
Central Bank Court-in the same breath that it rejected aider and
abettor liability-specifically recognized an implied section 10(b) right
of action against primary violators.239
Since Congress did not create a section 10(b) private cause of action, the Court was thus left with the task of determining the parameters of a cause of action that under its own approach would not be
235. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 198
(1994)(Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Steinberg, supra note 14, at 500; Paul
Dmitri Zier, Central Bank ofDenver v. FirstInterstateBank: Pruningthe Judicial Oak by Severing the Aiding and Abetting Branch, 72 DENy. U. L. Rav. 191,
212 (1994); David J. Baum, supra note 14, at 1841-42.
236. Because of the unique nature of section 10(b), that is, having no legislative history relating to a private remedy, it is unclear whether the Court will use its
strict constructionist approach with other provisions of the securities laws.
Notwithstanding the new greater acceptance of the strict textualism approach, it
is imprudent for the Court to disregard legislative history when it addresses the
language of a statute. It is hoped that the current Court will limit the use of its
pure textualist approach to only addressing other attempts to imply a right of
action.
237. See infra notes 283-323 and accompanying text. See also Baum, supranote 14, at
1839-41.
238. Therese H. Maynard, Foreward:The FourthAnnual Fritz B. Burns Lecture CentralBank: The Methodology, the Message, and the Future,29 Loy. LA. L. REV. 1,
1 (1995).
239. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 172-74
(1994).
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recognized. 240 The Court was unwilling to strike down section 10(b)'s
implied private right of action because in previous decisions it had acquiesced to lower court recognition of the right of action. 24 1 But, as
the dissent pointed out, aider and abettor liability under section 10(b)
was also equally accepted by all courts addressing the issue. 24 2 Even
more troubling is the fact that the Court had specifically and previously recognized other forms of secondary liability under section
10(b).243 The Court also had little difficulty in speculating on Con-

gress' intent,244 despite earlier Court decisions warning that "[the
Court should] by no means be understood as suggesting that we are
able to divine from the language of section 10(b) the express 'intent of
Congress' as to the contours of a private cause of action under rule
10(b)."245
Instead of addressing the questions presented by the certiorari petition, 24 6 the CentralBank Court directed the parties to address an
issue that even the defendants' lawyers believed was settledwhether aiding and abetting could be the basis for a section 10(b)
claim.247 In fact, the Court sought to resolve an issue it specifically

reserved in two previous decisions.24 8 Thus, a conservative court that
purportedly prides itself on judicial restraint engaged in selective activism. Unfortunately, in doing so, the Court rendered a sweeping de240. Alan R. Bromber, Aiding And Abetting Sudden Death and PossibleResurrection,
27 REv. SE.c. Comm. & REG. (1994); Joseph M. Hassett, Aiding and Abetting Liability for 10b-5 Violations, 26 REv. SE C. & Comm. REG. (Sept. 15, 1993).
241. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
242. Id. at 200-01. See also Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793
(3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1979); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon &
Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Securities &
Exchange Comm'n v. Coffey, 493 F. 2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
908 (1975).
243. See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972);
Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13
(1971).
244. See supra note 39.
245. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
246. While it may have been more prudent for Congress, either when the provision
was enacted or subsequently to specifically recognize a private right of action
under section 10(b), this Article does not support a dismantling of the implied
right of action under section 10(b) against primary violators. As the Court and
commentators have previously recognized, private enforcement of the securities
laws, especially through section 10(b), has played an essential role in effectuating
Congress' purpose for enacting the federal securities laws. Hassett, supra note
240, at 152.
247. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 508 U.S. 959
(1994)(mem.).
248. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 191-92 n.7 (1976) (reserving decision
on the issue of an implied cause of action under 10b-5). See also Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 379 n.5 (1983)(citing Hochfelder's
reservation).
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cision with broad implications that left at least as many unresolved
issues as were present before the decision was rendered. After CentralBank, aiding and abetting claims under section 10(b) are not viable, but questions remain concerning the status of conspiracy
claims. 249 For instance, how is an attorney or a court to resolve the
conflict between Central Bank25o and Bankers Life, which upheld an

implied cause of action under section 10(b) against conspirators?2 51 If
the law is as most subsequent lower courts have resolved it, would it
not have been more prudent for the Supreme Court to resolve any potential confusion?2 52
Likewise, it appears that under Central Bank's analysis, respondeat superior claims under section 10(b) may no longer be viable.253 If
that is the case, how does a federal court reconcile Central Bank254
and Affiliated Ute, which upheld a section 10(b) claim based upon
agency principles?255 While it may be that the Central Bank Court
rejected Affiliated Ute and Bankers Life sub silentio because the decision only addressed aiding and abetting,256 is there a reason for an
exception? 2 57 Should the Court continue to follow CentralBank's approach of rejecting prior decisions, such as Affiliated Ute and Bankers
Life, by implication? Is it not more appropriate for the Court to address related issues when addressing a consequential statutory issue?
Is it better for the Court to leave these questions to be resolved by
lower courts? Was the Court furthering its new approach to statutory
249.
250.
251.
252.

See supra notes 147 and 150 and accompanying text.
511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994).
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 6 (1971).
See, e.g., Pollack v. Laidlaw Holdings, [1995 Transfer Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep.

(CCH) 1 98,741 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 1995).
253. Compare Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S.
164, 200-01 (1994)(Stevens, J., dissenting) with ESI Montgomery County Inc. v.
Montgomery Int'l Corp., No. 94 Civ. 0119 (RLC), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 592
(S.D.N.Y Jan. 23, 1996). But see Pollack v. Laidlaw Holdings, [1995 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) T 98,741 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 1995).
254. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 177
(1994).
255. Id. at 200-01 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(following the majority's rationale, respondeat superior "appear[s] unlikely to survive"). See also Steinberg, supra note
14, at 501 ("In view of the Supreme Court's CentralBank decision, the continued
vitality of respondeat superior is open to debate.").
256. Cf. In re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 855 F. Supp 1086, 1088 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Van
De Velde v. Coopers & Lybrand, 899 F. Supp. 731, 731 (D. Mass. 1995); ESI
Montgomery v. Montgomery Int'l Corp., No. 94 Civ. 0119 (RLC), 1776 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 592 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 1996).
257. While the Court in Ernst& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), and Herman
& MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983) had previously refused to address

whether section 10(b) provided for aider and abettor claims, these decisions do
not rejectAffiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) and
Superintendent of Insurance of New York v. Banker's Life & Casualty Co., 404
U.S. 6 (1971).
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interpretation regardless of the decision's repercussions? In what
could be perceived as a pro-deep-pocket defendant decision, did the
Court further the purposes of the securities laws, for example, to protect investors and to provide efficient markets through full and fair
disclosure to investors? 2 58 There is little guidance given to the judiciary and the bar if the Court, in an effort to become more proactive to
resolve an unsettled question, created more questions than it settled.
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH-A SYSTEMATIC
ARCHEOLOGICAL INTENTIONALIST APPROACH
After reviewing the Central Bank decision, commentators have
questioned whether the Supreme Court will now address the litany of
unresolved secondary liability issues left by its decision.259 As mentioned previously, textualism in theory allows a court to examine the
structure of a statute in order to confirm its interpretation;2 60 but the
form of new textualism applied in Central Bank failed to look beyond
the provision at issue. Because the CentralBank Court was analyzing
the role of secondary liability in the Exchange Act, it should have addressed the Act's secondary liability provision. Apparently, the Court
did away with common law secondary liability claims under Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act. The only available alternative for plaintiffs
to bring such claims is based upon section 20(a)'s control person liability. However, lower courts have long been in conflict over the appropriate role and scope of section 20(a). 26 1
This Article does not call for the Court to merely engage in dictum.
The CentralBank Court sought to resolve an important issue involving the statutory framework of the securities laws, despite the fact
that the parties themselves had not raised the issue,2 62 but rendered
a sweeping decision whose impact went far beyond the Court's limited
analysis. Since the Court was analyzing one component of secondary
liability under the Exchange Act, yet rendered a decision that has affected all forms of secondary liability under the Exchange Act, the
Court should have addressed those other forms of secondary liability,
along with the secondary liability provision of the Exchange Act-sec258. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964)(unanimous court noting that among
the chief purposes of the securities laws is the protection of investors).
259. See, e.g., Matthews & Callcott, supra note 20 ('The Central Bank decision will
render more significant the explicit sources of secondary liability in the federal
securities law: § 15 of the 1933 Act and § 20(a) of the 1934 act.... Perhaps now
the Court will see fit to review the crazy quilt that lower courts have made of§ ...
29(a).").
260. See supra notes 50-65 and accompanying text.
261. Compare Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564 (9th Cir. 1990) with
Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975).
262. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 508 U.S. 959
(1993)(mem.).
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tion 20(a).2 63 Accordingly, by engaging in this more prudent course,
the Court not only could have addressed the unresolved issues relating to section 10(b) raised by its decision, but also could have resolved
the litany of unresolved issues pertaining to secondary liability under
section 20(a).2 64

VII. PRE- & POST-CENTRAL BANK CONFLICT
OVER SECTION 20(a)
The federal circuits have been in considerable conflict over which
provisions of the Exchange Act addressed secondary liability. Plaintiffs' lawyers have effectively circumvented section 20(a)'s statutory
good faith defenses by bringing agency and other forms of secondary
liability under section 10(b).265 Over time, this resulted in relegating
section 20(a) to a minor component of the enforcement provisions of
the securities laws.
Had the CentralBank Court more exhaustively addressed the issues it was opining upon, it would have resolved the question concerning the appropriate vehicle for bringing secondary liability claims
under the Exchange Act. Even under a traditional textualist analysis,
an inquiry into the legislative history of an ambiguous statutory provision is appropriate to buttress a court's conclusion.266 Had the Central Bank court undertaken such an approach to ascertain the 73rd
Congress' meaning of the ambiguous term "control person,"2 6 7 the
Court should have concluded that section 20(a) is the only provision in
the Exchange Act where such claims could be brought. Nevertheless,
it appears to be settled that, as a result of CentralBank, section 20(a),
which remains subject to various interpretations, is the exclusive
means under the Exchange Act by which a plaintiff can bring a secondary liability claim.268
263. While section 20(a) refers to "control person," federal courts have not limited this
provision to individuals. See, e.g., Vucinich v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis,
Inc., 803 F.2d 454,461 (9th Cir. 1986); DelPorte v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 548
F.2d 1149, 1153-54 (5th Cir. 1977); SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981, 986-87
(7th Cir. 1972); see also Burns, supra note 133, at 1187 ("Courts have expanded
the [control person] provisions to include claims against firms and
corporations.").
264. L. Loss & J. SEIGMAN, SEctmrris REGULATIONs 4467 (1990).

265. See Fischel, supra note 105, at 86 ("[T]o preclude employers from relying upon
this good faith defense, plaintiffs have sued defendants under section 10(b) using
the theories of respondeat superior."). In addition, prior to Central Bank, it was
fairly commori in securities litigation for plaintiffs' lawyers merely to add a control person cause of action that mirrored the section 10(b) secondary liability
claim.
266. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
267. Eisenberg, supra note 53, at 29-36; Plass, supra note 2, at 107-08.
268. See McGann v. Ernst & Young, [1995-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) T 99,061 (C.D. Cal. May 30, 1995)(Secondary liability claims under § 10(b)
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Interestingly, an ill-reasoned Supreme Court decision now focuses
the debate on the conflict concerning the role of section 20(a), the section that the enacting Congress intended secondary claims to be
brought under in the first place.2 69 But that ill-reasoned decision, instead of merely alluding to the issue, could have resolved the conflicts
concerning section 20(a). A review of the legislative history of the Exchange Act demonstrates that the 73rd Congress intended that section
20(a) be both broad in scope and the exclusive means 2 70 of addressing
secondary liability under the Exchange Act.271 The conflict concerning the intended role of section 20(a) and the weakness of the preCentralBank majority view will be brought to light by analyzing Congress' intent with regard to secondary liability.272
VIII. THE EXCLUSIVITY OF SECTION 20(a)
The pre-CentralBank majority view on the exclusivity of section
20(a) held "that section 20(a) was intended to supplement, and not
supplant," the common law theory of respondeat superior as a basis
for secondary liability in securities cases. 2 73 Essentially, the majority
view supported relegating the importance of section 20(a) claims to
virtually an afterthought of section 10(b) secondary liability claims.
As a result of Central Bank, that majority view fails; and section 20(a)
have been eliminated by the CentralBank decision.); In re Cascade Intl. Sec. Li269.
270.
271.
272.

273.

tig., 894 F. Supp. 437 (S.D. Fla. 1995)(plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to
demonstrate defendant may be liable for a primary violation).
Matthew & Callcott, supra note 20.
Arguably, the Central Bank Court could have used this analysis as the basis for
its holding.
Could it be that the Court wanted to limit plaintiffs' recourse despite the 73d
Congress' intent? See, e.g., The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
While the legislative history of the control person liability provisions does not
directly resolve the question of the exclusivity of section 20(a), there is substantial authority to support such an approach. See, e.g., Fitzpartick & Carman,
supra note 132, at 4.
Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1576-78 (9th Cir. 1990). See also
In re Atlantic Fin. Management, Inc., 784 F.2d 29, 32-34 (1st Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1972 (1987)(section 20(a)) is not the exclusive basis for imposing
liability, rather it is concurrent with liability based on common law notions of
apparent authority); Coomerford v. Olson, 794 F.2d 1319, 1322-23 (8th Cir.
1986)(section 20(a) supplements common law agency principles); Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 712-17 (2d Cir. 1980)(section 20(a) does not
preclude remedies under traditional agency principles); Paul F. Newton & Co. v.
Texas Comm. Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1118-19 (5th Cir. 1980)(section 20(a) imposes
secondary liability independent from common law agency principles which remain viable); Holloway v. Howerod, 536 F.2d 690, 694-95 (6th Cir. 1976)(section
20(a) expands the scope of liability beyond the common law theory of respondeat
superior); Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731, 740-41 (10th Cir.
1974)(common law agency principles of apparent authority are applicable to
corporations.).
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remains the exclusive means for addressing secondary liability under
the Exchange Act.274 Nevertheless, a review of the legislative and ju-

dicial authority concerning the role of section 20(a) demonstrates that
the Central Bank Court, while not fully resolving the issue of secondary liability, was correct in rejecting secondary liability claims under
section 10(b)275 because Congress did not intend for the Exchange
Act's key secondary liability provision, section 20(a), to be supplemented by common law claims under section 10(b).
The leading pre-Central Bank majority view decisions, coming
from the Second and Fifth Circuits, held that the legislative history of
section 20(a) does not reflect any congressional intent to restrict secondary liability for violations of the Act's control person provision.2 76
The Fifth Circuit stated in PaulF. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce
Bank that limiting secondary liability under the [Exchange Act] to
that liability provided by section 20(a) would contradict the pervasive
application of agency principles in nearly all other areas of the
law."27 7 Courts and scholars supporting this view have also cited to

the Exchange Act, section 28,278 which provides that "[tihe rights and
remedies provided by this title shall be in addition to any and all other
rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity."2 79 For example, Professors Loss and Seligman argue that section 28's savings
clause is eloquent testimony to the absence of any intent to preempt
common law secondary liability.280

A single circuit court,28 1 which is now in the majority as a result of
CentralBank, held that section 20(a) is the exclusive means for estab274. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 199
n.12 (1994)(Stevens, J., dissenting). See also supra notes 20 & 143-55.
275. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 193
(1994).
276. See, e.g., Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1577 (9th Cir. 1990);
Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 712 (2d Cir. 1980); Paul F.
Newtown & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1118 (5th Cir. 1980);
S.E.C. v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 812 (2d Cir. 1975).
277. Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1118 (5th Cir.
1980).
278. L. Loss & J. Seligman, supra note 261, at 4477. See also Marbury Management,
Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d. Cir. 1980); Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas
Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1118 (5th Cir. 1980).
279. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1994), provides in pertinent part:
The rights and remedies provided by this title shall be in addition to
any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity;
but no person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of this chapter shall recover, through satisfaction of judgement in
one or more actions, a total amount in excess of his actual damages on
account of the act complained of.
280. L. Loss & J. Seligman, supra note 261, at 4477-78.
281. See Rochez Bros. Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975).

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:377

lishing secondary liability.282 In Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades,28 3 the
Third Circuit held that in determining the scope of the applicability of
agency principles under the Exchange Act it is helpful to evaluate the
legislative history of the Act itself and, specifically, section 20(a). 284
The Rochez court noted that the legislative history of section 20(a) indicated that "Congress intended liability to be based on something besides control. That something is culpable participation."28 5 The court
noted that the use of agency doctrines, such as respondeat superior,
would not advance that legislative purpose and would undermine congressional intent by emasculating section 20(a).28 6 Furthermore, the

court stated that the use of respondeat superior would, in essence, impose a duty on a corporation to supervise its employees or to face pricourt believed Congress did not
mary liability, a standard that the
28 7
intend to impose on corporations.
Irrespective of Central Bank, the reasoning of the decisions supporting the non-exclusivity of section 20(a) have failed to recognize the
intended purpose and importance of that provision. They have generally reasoned that Congress intended to expand the common law, and
this could only occur if respondeat superior and section 20(a) were
statutory scheme.28 8 However, these
available in a complementary
28 9
arguments are misplaced.
The pre-CentralBank majority view was based on the premise that
the 73rd Congress intended that common law secondary liability
claims could be brought under the Exchange Act, but a section other
than 20(a). But the problem is there was no such suitable provision
under the Exchange Act and Congress did not intend for there to be
one. 2 90 An analysis of section 20(a) is unlike addressing implied

282. Id. at 884-86. Some writers argue that the Third Circuit's view now resembles
the majority view in light of Sharp v. Cooper's & Lyband, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir.
1982). See J. Christopher York, Vicarious Liability of ControllingPersons: RespondeatSuperiorand the Securities Acts, 42 EMORY L.J. 313, 318 (1993). Nevertheless, the Rochez decision was one of the last supporters of the exclusivity
argument.
283. 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975).
284. Id. at 884. In addressing the viability of agency-based secondary liability claims
under section 10(b), the Rochez court, unlike the CentralBank Court, recognized
the need to analyze section 20(a).
285. Id. at 884-85.
286. Id. at 885. See also David S. Ruder, Multiple Defendants on Securities Law
FraudCases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy,in Pari Delicto, Indemnification,
and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597, 608 (1972).
287. Rochez Bros v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d, 880, 885 (3d Cir. 1975).
288. See, e.g., Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1577 (9th Cir. 1990);
Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir. 1980).
289. See Rochez Bros v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 884-85 (3d Cir. 1975).
290. When the Exchange Act was first introduced, there were only four provisions that
even addressed civil liability: (1) section 9(e), then section 8, provides civil liability for those who "willfully participate" in price manipulation of securities; (2)
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rights of action under section 10(b), where Congress had not provided
guidance for how to treat wrongdoers. The 73rd Congress expressed
its intent on how to treat secondary liability when it enacted section
20(a).2 9 1 In fact, section 20(a) is the only provision in the Exchange
Act as originally2 introduced and enacted that even addressed secon2
dary liability. 9

What the majority of courts and commentators essentially argued
was that Congress intended section 20(a)'s control person liability to
supplement secondary liability claims available under section
10(b).293 Congress, however, did not provide for any civil liability
under section 10(b); such a cause of action was judicially created.
Thus, there was never a need to imply a secondary liability cause of
action under section 10(b) when Congress had expressed its intent
through section 20(a).
In addition, the pre-CentralBank majority is incorrect in holding
that the legislative history of sections 15 and 20(a) "do not reflect any
congressional intent to restrict secondary liability for violations of the
[A]cts to the controlled persons formula... "294 As originally enacted,
2 95
the Securities Act, section 15, did not have a good faith defense.
When section 15 was amended a year later to include the good faith
defense, Senator Fletcher, a drafter of the Acts, explained:
The purpose of this amendment is to restrict the scope of the section so as
more accurately to carry out its real purpose. The mere existence of control is
exercised to
not made a basis for liability unless that control is2 9effectively
6
bring about the action upon which liability is based.

291.

292.
293.
294.
295.

296.

section 18, then section 17, imposes civil liability for false or misleading statements in any report required under the Act; (3) section 16(b), then section 15(b),
allows for recovery by the issuer of any profit made by an insider on a sale of the
issuer's securities within a period of less than six months; and (4) section 20(a),
then section 19, provides control person liability. 78 CONG. REC. 2270-71 (1934).
See Sager, supranote 103, at 822; Nancy C. Staudt, ControllingSecuritiesFraud:
Proposed Liability Standardsfor Controlling Persons Under the 1933 and 1934
Securities Acts, 72 MINN. L. Rv. 930 (1988)(In addition to establishing primary
liability, Congress established secondary liability through section 15 and section
20(a).).
See supra note 289.
See supra note 277.
Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1118 (5th Cir.
1980).
See Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 132, at 22-24; Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm (1994).
78 CONG. Rac. 8185 (1934); 78 CoNG. REc. 10,265 (1934).
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Since section 20(a) was based upon section 15,297 Congress concluded
that liability was not to be based merely on the relationship of the
defendants, as it is with respondeat superior, but on culpability. 298
The argument that section 28 negates any theory of exclusivity
under section 20(a) is equally misplaced. The legislative history of
section 28 does not support the majority view that a plaintiff can substitute section 20(a)'s prescriptions with more favorable common law
secondary liability principles.299 Congressional committees reviewing
the proposed statute explained that section 28 (then section 27)
"reserves the rights and remedies existing outside of those provided in
."30
the act. ...

Early committee statements demonstrate that Congress, by enacting section 28, recognized that the Exchange Act was not preempting
then existing state or common law remedies.3 01 The statements by
members of Congress and the questions raised by various interested
parties concerning section 28 do not suggest that an injured party
could replace remedies under the Exchange Act with remedies available under common law, for example, using a respondeat superior
claim under section 10(b) instead of section 20(a).3 02 The concerns relating to section 28 addressed during the congressional hearings do
not support using common law remedies as the Act's remedies, but
merely relate to whether the statute would preempt state laws or the
self-regulatory authority of the stock exchanges.303
297. Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1115-16 (5th Cir.
1980)(citing hearings on S. Res. 84 (72d Cong.) and S. Res 56 and 97 (73d Cong.)
before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 15,
at 6571 (1934)).
298. H.R. Rep. No. 1838 73d Cong., 2nd Sess. 42 (1934)("The mere existence of control
is made a basis for liability if it is shown that the controlling person had no
knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of the facts upon
which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to be based.") See also Marbury Management Inc., v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 715-16 (2d Cir. 1980)(a plaintiff
must show the controlling person was "in some meaningful sense [a] culpable
participant jI in the fraud perpetrated by [the] controlled person[ 1").
299. An eloquent argument supporting this point is addressed in Fitzpatrick and Carmen's article on section 20(a). See generally Fitzpatrick & Carmen, supra note
132.
300. 78 CONG. REc. 7709 (1934)(emphasis added).
301. 78 CONG. REc. 2270 (1934); 78 CONG. REC. 7709 (1934).
302. See also Fitzpatrick & Carmen, supra note 132, at 24.
303. One commentator expressed the concern: "it appears that the authority of the
respective states to regulate brokers engaged in business therein would be practically emasculated." Hearing before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce House of Representatives, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 22 on H.R. 7852 (March
8, 1934 Hearings of House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce)(statements by Adolph Johnson, chief counsel to the Public Service Commissioner of Wisconsin). Other commentators during the hearing process also
expressed a belief that section 28(a) was meant to supersede state law. Id.
(March 6, 1934 Hearings of House Committee on Interstate And Foreign Con-
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IX. SECTION 20(a)'s INTENDED COVERAGE
While the majority of authority analyzing section 20(a) limits the
provision's control person language to a form of agency-based liability,304 section 20(a) is broad enough and was likely intended to address a broader range of activity that comes within the traditional
rubric of secondary liability.305 When Senator Fletcher first intro-

duced a bill entitled "The National Securities Exchange Act of 1934,"
the bill contained a control person section that was broad enough to
cover liability based upon respondeat superior, conspiracy, and aiding
and abetting principles. 30 6 Specifically, section 20(a), then numbered
section 19, provided liability for "every person who,... [controls any
person] pursuant to or in connection with any agreement or understandingwith one or more other persons by or through stock ownership, agency or otherwise ... ."307
The congressional debate during the relevant period demonstrates
that section 20(a) was to be broadly construed, covering culpable persons who were not active wrongdoers3O8 but because of their "behind
the scenes" participation were liable under principles of secondary liability.309 Section 20(a)'s legislative history indicates that Congress
purposefully refused to define a "control person:
merce)(Statements by Honorable John Dickinson, Asst. Sec. of Commerce and
Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Stock Exchange to the House
of Representatives Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce). Another
commentator questioned the constitutionality of section 28's preemption of state

304.

305.

306.
307.
308.

309.

law. Id. (February 23, 1934 Hearings of House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce)(statements by Richard Whitney, President of the New York
Stock Exchange).
See, e.g., Burns, supra note 133, at 1185 ("The conflict between agency principles
and the controlling person provisions arises from subtle differences in their
method of application."); Staudt, supra note 291, at 934 ("Section 15 of the 1933
Act and section 20(a) of the 1934 Act establish liability similar in nature to the
common law doctrine of respondeat superior."). See also Fey v. Walston & Co.,
Inc., 493 F.2d 1036, 1051 (7th Cir. 1974)(In view of the extension of the general
respondeat superior doctrine by section 20(a), courts have tended to emphasize
the control aspects of vicarious liabilities in the securities context.).
Ruder, supra note 16, at 602 ("The broad approach taken toward the definition [of
the term control person] might suggest that the number of persons falling into
the "control" category would be rather large.").
78 CONG. REc. 2264-72 (1934).
Id. at 2269 (emphasis added).
Section 19's purpose was to prevent evasion of the provisions of that section by
organizing dummies who will undertake the actual things forbidden by the section. Stock Exchange Practices: Hearingson S. Res. 84 (72d Cong.) and S. Res.
56 and S. Res. 97 (73d Cong.) Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6571 (1934)(statement of Thomas Gardiner Corcoran,
Office of Counsel for Reconstruction Finance Corp.). See also 78 CONG. REC.
8094-95 (1934).
78 CONG. lmc. 8094-95 (1934).
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When reference is made to "control," the term is intended to include actual
control as well as what has been called legally enforceable control. [citations
omitted]. It was thought undesirable to attempt to define the term. It would
be difficult if not impossible to enumerate or to anticipate the many ways in
which actual control may be exerted. A few examples
of the methods used are
310
stock ownership, lease, contract, and agency.

Notwithstanding recent decisions limiting Section 20(a) liability to respondeat superior type claims, the enacting Congress expressly rejected limiting section 20(a) liability to agency-based liability. On
May 4, 1934, Representative Hollister, in an attempt to do away with
the ambiguous "control person" language, introduced an amendment
to strike section 20(a), then section 19. While other commentators
have made reference to the Hollister-Lea debate, 3 11 a review of this
significant discourse in greater depth is necessary in order to appreciate Congress' intended scope for section 20(a):
Mr. Hollister:
If there is any Member of this House who would like to stand up and define to
me what a controlling person is, I should like to know ...what an agent is; we
know that if you perform something through an agent you perform it yourself.
The term "agent" has a reasonable and well known legal meaning, but I
should like to have someone tell me in what law, in what decisions, or in what
textbooks I can be told what a controlling person is. I say that such a provision in no sense belongs in this law.
Let me repeat that my amendment is merely an attempt to protect against the
strike suit and takes out of the bill nothing which in any way is involved in the
so-called "teeth" of the bill. It is a protection for the average man who should
be able to be assured that he will not have to defend himself from suit when,
as a matter of fact, he is not culpable....

Mr. Lea:
The object of this provision is to catch the man who stands behind the scenes
and controls the man who is in a nominal position of authority. The man in
control is just as well known as a dummy on a directorate....

Mr. Hollister:
Would not an ordinary agency provision cover that? A man is either an agent
or he is not an agent.

Mr. Lea:
There would be no contractual relation, necessarily. It is just the same position as in the control of a dummy on a directorate. The man who stands behind the scenes and dominates the dummy ought to be responsible because he
is the real party in interest.

Mr. Hollister:
The gentleman means that no matter how honest the man nominating the
director may have been in making the nomination, if the director does something unlawful and unknown to the man nominating him, the latter should be
held responsible?
310. H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1934). See also 78 CONG. REC. 7709
(1934).
311. Burns, supra note 133, at 1204-05. See also Staudt, supra note 291, at 933.
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Mr. Lea:
The man charged with control is only responsible to the extent he did control
the action complained of, and his actual control must be established.

Mr. Hollister:
What would constitute such control? Can the gentleman define to me any
legal way a man can decide whether he has such control?...

Mr. Lea:
It is a question of fact to be determined by the issues presented in the case....

Mr. Hollister:
I know there is the test of agency, and I know of no other test which would
make a person responsible criminally....

Mr. Lea:
It is simply a question of putting the responsibility on the man who is really
responsible....
It is a question of proving the case in court on the basis of the facts to show
that one man did control the other in doing a wrongful thing, and until you
have done that there is no punishment or penalty.

Mr. Hollister:
[HIere you are creating a new kind of unlawful act which is contrary to all
accepted principles of jurisprudence.

Mr. Lea:
I think the gentleman is mistaken in stating it is a new kind of responsibility.
If he will refer to the definitions of the word "control," as established by the
courts as set forth in Words and Phrases, 31 2 he 3will
find the term is well
13
known and its meaning has been long established.

Representative Hollister's amendment to strike out section 20(a) was
rejected by a vote of 56 to 30,314 which illustrates that the 73rd Congress intended Section 20(a) to be based upon culpable participation
and did not intend section 20(a) to merely address agency forms of
liability.3 15
Likewise, the various versions of Section 20(a) support an expansive reading of the section. When the Exchange Act was proposed,
section 20(a) provided for liability for "every person who, by or through
stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, or who pursuantto or in connection with any agreement or understandingwith one or more other persons by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, controls any
312.
313.
314.
315.

See, e.g., Handy & Harman v. Burnet, 284 U.S. 136 (1931).
78 CONG. REc. 8094-95 (1934).
78 CONG. REc. 8095 (1934).
While the Hollister-Lea debate and the Senate's ensuing vote provides significant
insight into the 73d Congress' understanding of section 20(a)'s control person language, the form of new textualism advocated by those such as Justices Scalia and
Kennedy, in all probability, would not seek guidance from this valuable legislative evidence. This is a reason in and of itself to reject textualism.
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person liable under any provision of this Act."316 This language was
initially adopted by both the House of Representative's and the Senate's versions of the bill.317 Eventually, the "through stock owner-

ship" language of the provision was replaced with anyone who
"directly or indirectly" controls a violator.3 18 A House of Representatives Committee explained that the Senate amendment did not contain the language "alone or pursuant to or in connection with any
agreement or understanding" because it was considered mere
"surplusage."319
Additionally, federal courts have construed the term "control"
broadly, "imposing few limitations" on the categories of persons who
may meet the standard.32o In general, the courts have only required
that the controlling person possess some indirect means of discipline
or have influence over the controlled person. 3 2 1 Since Congress construed section 20(a) broadly, enabling it to address not only agencybased liability but other forms of secondary liability against those who
acted "behind the scenes,"322 defendants who enter into a conspiracy

or aid and abet a violation should be liable under section 20(a), provided that they possessed some means of discipline or influence over
the controlled person. Several federal decisions support this broad

reading of section 20(a).3 23 These decisions recognized section 20(a)
316. S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934)(emphasis added).
317. H.R. 7852 as introduced by Congressman Rayburn and referred to the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, February 10, 1934, S. 2693 as introduced by Senator Fletcher and referred to the Senate Banking and Currency
Committee, February 9, 1934. 78 CONG. REC. 2378 (1934)(House version); 78
CONG. REc. 2204-70 (1934)(Senate version).
318. S. 3420 as reported by the Senate April 20, 1934, S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1934).
319. 78 CONG. REC. 10263 (1934).
320. Ralph C. Ferrara & Diane Sanger, DerivativeLiability in Securities Law: Controlling Person Liability, Respondeat Superior, and Aiding and Abetting, 40
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1007, 1009-11 (1983).
321. Staudt, supra note 291, at 288 (collecting cases). See also Lanza v. Drexel & Co.,
[1970-71 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 92,826, 90,102-03 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), affd on othergrounds, 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973)(section 20(a) requires
only "some indirect means of discipline or influence"); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d
718, 738 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968)(control is broadly defined as influence short of actual control).
322. The legislative history also evinces that "control persons" act not only in complicity with an active wrongdoer, but are the persons who directed the scheme to
defraud, which demonstrates that Congress intended secondary liability based
upon culpability. 78 CONG. REC. 8095 (1934).
323. Richardson v. MacAurthur, 451 F.2d 35, 41-42 (10th Cir. 1971)(section 20(a) not
restricted by principles of agency or conspiracy). See also First Interstate Bank of
Denver v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 896 (10th Cir. 1992)(section 20(a) is to be construed liberally); In re Clearly Canadian Sec. Litig., 875 F. Supp. 1410, 1420
(N.D. Cal. 1995)(complaint contained sufficient allegations of a conspiracy to support section 20(a) claim); Hershack v. Fiasck, [1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed.
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claims based upon aider and abettor liability as well as liability based
upon conspiracy. 32 4 Specifically, the decisions noted that section 20(a)
was not to be restricted by principles of agency. 32 5

Thus, both the legislative history of section 20(a) and section 28,
along with several federal decisions on point, support the view that
section 20(a) was not only the exclusive means for addressing secondary liability under the Exchange Act, but was also intended to address a variety of forms of secondary liability. Accordingly, there was
no reason for courts to use section 10(b) to address secondary liability
claims, other than to support plaintiffs' lawyers' savvy avoidance of
section 20(a)'s good faith defenses.326
X. OTHER IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION: EQUALLY
TROUBLING STATUTORY REFORM
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("Reform
Act") was enacted on December 22, 1995, when the Senate overrode
President Clinton's veto of the bill. The intent of the Reform Act was
to combat perceived abuses in the securities litigation process. 3 2 7 The
Reform Act, among other things, establishes presumptions and procedures for determining plaintiffs' counsel and class representatives in
class action securities suits, provides more stringent pleading requirements for fraud, supports sanctions if claims are unsupported, and
generally limits liability proportionate to responsibility. 3 2s
In response to the CentralBank decision, the Reform Act expressly
grants to the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") the right to
seek injunctions or sue for money damages against persons who aid
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)

97,204, 94,831 (E.D. Pa. 1992)(aiding and abetting and sec-

tion 20(a)); Spear, Leeds, & Kellogg v. Public Serv. Co. of N.H., 700 F. Supp. 791,
793 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)(defendants liable under section 20(a) as aiders and abettors);
Noland v. Gurley, 566 F. Supp. 210, 221 (D.D.C. Colo 1983)(section 20(a) not restricted by principles of agency or conspiracy); Savino v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 507
F. Supp. 1225, 1242-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)(plaintiff need only allege control by status in order to state a claim under section 20(a)); First City Fed. Sav. Bank v.
Dennis, 710 F. Supp. 74, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)(aiding and abetting claim under sec-

tion 20(a)).
324. See, e.g., Spear, Leeds, & Kellogg v. Public Serv. Co. of N.H., 700 F. Supp. 791,
793 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re Clearly Canadian Sec. Litig., 875 F. Supp. 1410, 1420
(N.D. Cal. 1995).
325. Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 41 (10th Cir. 1971); Myzel v. Fields, 386
F.2d 718, 738 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
326. See Fischel, supra note 105, at 86-87.
327. See House Conference Report, H. Rep. No. 369, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 31-32, reprinted in 1995 U.S. CODE CONG. & AnauN. NEws at 730 ('The private securities
litigation system is too important to the integrity of American capital markets to
allow this system to be undermined by those who seek to line their pockets by
bringing abusive and meritless suits.").
328. Congress overrides Presidenes Veto of Securities Reform Measure, Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) No. 1694, at 1-3 (Dec. 27, 1995); Fallone, supra note 70.
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and abet primary violations of the securities laws. 32 9 The Reform Act,
however, does not overrule that portion of the Central Bank decision
concerning implied civil rights of action for aiding and abetting under
section 10(b).330 A Senate Committee Report noted that overruling
Central Bank's holding with respect to private litigants would be contrary to the Reform Act's goal of reducing meritless securities litigation.3 3 1 With this summary statement, the current Congress appears
to adopt the view that secondary liability facilitates meritless
litigation.
Interestingly, the Reform Act provides the SEC the right to sue
3 32
aiders and abetters by amending section 20 of the Exchange Act.
Congress thus followed the Central Bank Court's approach of limiting
the issue to aider and abettor liability under section 10(b). While Congress amended section 20 and, therefore, overruled Central Bank in
part, Congress, by refusing to look at the 73rd Congress' intent in
passing section 20(a), utterly failed to recognize that private litigants
and the SEC, even after Central Bank, should have had the right to
redress against aiders and abetters under the Exchange Act's secondary liability section-section 20(a). By amending section 20 to empower the SEC to bring aider and abetter claims, Congress suggests
that aider and abettor liability claims were not available under the
Exchange Act as a result of Central Bank. If the SEC previously had
such a right under section 20(a),3 33 section 20 did not have to be
amended. As demonstrated in the previous section, Congress' amendment of section 20 is inconsistent with the 73rd Congress' intended
scope of coverage of section 20(a) and judicial application of that
section.
XI.

BENEFITS OF RECOGNIZING THE APPROPRIATE
ROLE OF SECTION 20(a)

There are several reasons for supporting the revival of section
20(a)'s control person liability, all of which essentially relate to following the 73rd Congress' intent. In general, this approach diminishes
the impact of the current Court's inclination to substitute Congress'
intent through the use of textualism. Specifically, the recognition of
section 20(a)'s role will avoid the thorny issues a court is faced with
329. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737 (1995).
330. Id.
331. S. Rep. No. 98, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
332. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67 (1995).
333. SEC v. First Jersey Securities, Inc., 876 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)(the SEC
may bring enforcement action under Section 20(a) to enjoin violations of the securities statutes creating control person liability), affd, 101 F.3d 1450 (2d Cir.
1996); SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 812 (2d Cir. 1975).
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when addressing implied rights of action, for example, Affiliated
Ute33 4 versus Central Bank.3 35 In addition, when Congress legislates

and explicitly expresses its intent, courts should take heed and follow
Congress' view. This is especially so in the case of secondary liability
where Congress had expressed through section 20(a) how secondary
liability should be addressed under the Exchange Act. Courts should
not be swayed by efforts that circumvent defenses provided by a statute, for example, the use of section 10(b) to avoid section 20(a)'s good
faith defenses.
Further, when Congress enacted the Exchange Act, culpability was
an essential prerequisite for liability.336 Section 20(a)'s language recognizes this and avoids the troubling effect caused when agency-based
liability arises under section 10(b).337 Securities cases often involve

the wrongdoing of only a small number of an issuer's officers, employees, or both. The fraud committed by these wrongdoers usually is
committed for their own personal benefit and not for the benefit of the
issuer. While the issuer may receive some incidental benefit, such as
an increase in the price of its stock, if the wrongdoing was not a part of
the corporate culture or was accomplished as a result of the influence
exerted by the issuer, then innocent shareholders eventually compensate other innocent shareholders and their lawyers for the wrongs of
those who should be accountable but often are not because they are
judgment-proof.
Indeed, Judge Friendly, in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co.,338 expressed this concern, noting that unduly expansive imposition of civil
liability "will lead to large judgments, payable in the last analysis by
innocent investors, for the benefit of speculators and their lawyers...
."339 Another scholar has noted one source of perplexity as to
the appropriate bounds of the civil remedy for misleading filings is
that any remedy imposed against the issuer itself is indirectly im334. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972).
335. Central Bank of Denver v. Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994).
336. See 78 CONG. REc. 8094-95 (1934). In addition, the majority of federal courts
addressing the requisite intent for liability under section 20(a) have held that a
control person must have some level of culpability. See, e.g., Hunt v. Miller, 908
F.2d 1210, 1215 (4th Cir. 1990); Orloff v. Allman, 819 F.2d 904, 907 (9th Cir.
1987); Durham v. Kelly, 810 F.2d 1500, 1504 (9th Cir. 1987); Buhler v. Audio
Leasing Corp., 807 F.2d 833, 835-36 (9th Cir. 1987); Kersh v. General Council of
Assemblies of God, 804 F.2d 546, 549 (9th Cir. 1986); Rochez Bros., Inc. v.
Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 885, 888-89 (3d Cir. 1975); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479
F.2d 1277, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973); Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d
689, 697 (9th Cir. 1967).
337. Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 884 (3d Cir. 1975).
338. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom., Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976
(1967).
339. Id. at 867 (Friendly, J. concurring). See also Michael M. Boone & Patrick F. McGowan, Standing to Sue Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 49 Tx L. REv. 617 (1971).
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posed on all holders of the common stock, which is usually the most
important segment of the total category of investors intended to be
protected.340 While the use of respondeat superior imposes liability
on the issuer irrespective of culpability, section 20(a), on the other
hand, follows Congress' intent that liability be based on culpability 3 4 1
and allows the issuer to raise good faith defenses, which could lead to
more equitable results.
XII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's adoption of a textualist theory of statutory
interpretation in the securities field evolved from a questionable application of precedent and the rejection of the stated legislative purpose
of the securities laws. As evidenced by the CentralBank decision, the
Court's application of textualism has resulted in a violation of the very
tenets of textualism-replacing the legislature's values with those of
the judiciary. As such, the decision illustrates the ease with which
textualism can allow an exceedingly narrow approach to interpreting
a statute and textualism's failure to acknowledge the role of interpretative tools, such as other statutory provisions or legislative history.
The decision thus represents the Court's latest effort at usurping and
distorting the 73rd Congress' intent concerning the civil remedies
available under the Exchange Act. With the Central Bank decision,
the Supreme Court not only legislated but also created an opinion that
will necessitate several more decisions to clarify its holding. Had the
Court respected, instead of rejected, legislative history, the Court
would have resolved the conflict concerning the appropriate role of
secondary liability under the securities laws. The Court, however,
failed to follow the enacting Congress' intent and failed to recognize
the importance of the Exchange Act's section 20(a), the provision
whereby the Court should have begun its analysis.

340. Milton H. Cohen, "Truth In Securities"Revisited, 79 HARv. L.
(1966).
341. See Sager, supra note 103, at 838-39.
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